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The Expansion of Occupational Safety and Health Law
Nina G. Stillman andJohn R. Wheeler*
I.

Introduction

The Industrial Revolution moved the worker of the nineteenth century out of the relative safety of his cottage into large and often unsafe
factories where worker health and safety were not a primary focus of
either the new industrial pioneers or of society as a whole.' The laissez
faire economy ultimately gave rise to reform movements which addressed the societal needs that inevitably followed from this new progress. A part of these reform movements was directed to the worker and,
as a result, various programs began to deal with the consequences of the
appalling number of worker accidents and injuries.2 Although Germany
initiated reforms to safeguard its workers in 18843 and England developed a worker's compensation program in 1897, 4 it was not until the first
two decades of this century that the various states began to enact
worker's compensation statutes5 and protective legislation. 6 Even then,
there were large gaps in coverage of occupations and illnesses and wide
variations from state to state.
Nevertheless, worker's compensation was, until the late 1960s, the
preeminent occupational health legislation in the United States. In the
last two decades, however, a number of forces have expanded occupational health law. This expansion is due to changing social values and
perceptions. There were, for example, perceived increases in occupational injuries and compensation costs which indicated a need for a prophylactic approach to employee safety and health. 7 Society has also
become more aware of health and healthy environments-an awareness
heightened daily by tremendous media attention. Of similar importance
is the explosion of occupational disease cases and the often astronomical
awards these cases sometimes engender, the mass occupational illness
cases arising from the use of substances such as asbestos and dioxin and
accidents such as the incident in Bhopal, India. In cases such as these,
* Ms. Stillman is a partner in the law firm of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz representing
management clients in employment, labor and occupational health law matters. Mr. Wheeler, who is
both a Ph.D. scientist as well as an attorney, is Assistant General Counsel for Occidental Chemical
Corporation, handling corporate environmental, safety and health law matters. The authors wish to
thank Kim A. Leffert of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz for her assistance in the preparation of
this Article.
I OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAw I (La Dou ed. 1981).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers" Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 n.1 (1983).
6 Williams, Firingthe 1lloman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employmeit
Opportnity Goals under Title 1IW, 69 GEo. L. REV. 641, 654 (1981); Note, supra note 5, at 1644.
7 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
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imaginative plaintiffs' attorneys have developed new legal theories to circumvent the worker's compensation exclusive remedy doctrine.8 This
has helped create the social phenomenon called the "toxic tort." 9
Another factor contributing to the dramatic growth of occupational
health law is the changing nature of the work force. In response to new
social values (reflected in part in our equal employment opportunity legislation) the number of female, handicapped and older workers has significantly increased. 10 The work force today is also far more mobile than
in the past. Employees frequently move from employer to employer and
state to state rather than remain with the same employer in the same
town for their entire working life.
Finally, organized labor has contributed significantly to the growth
of occupational safety and health law through its increased focus on employee health and safety, and its use of that focus in organizing workers,
negotiating with employers, and pursuing grievance procedures aimed at
furthering the interests of unions and their members."I
Advocates of safe and healthy workplaces have generally taken three
approaches in pursuing their goals. The prophylactic approach has given
12
birth to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act"),
it was a consideration in the development of the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1977 ("TSCA")' 8 and it has affected the creative application
of our labor and employment laws to health and safety issues. The remedial approach historically has been synonymous with worker's compensation statutes, but more recently has encompassed tort litigation aimed at
the suppliers of materials to the workplace, and in some circumstances at
the immediate employer as well. Finally, the punitive approach, which in
its milder forms has involved regulatory monetary penalties, now embraces criminal sanctions to deter employers from creating (or not abating) undue risks to life and health. 14
State and federal legislatures, regulatory agencies, and the courts
have responded to emerging social values by expanding occupational
safety and health law. They place the worth of the individual, his life and
his health above the worth of the products he manufactures and the
processes with which he labors. As the industrial revolution waned, new
human rights arose, and within the past two decades the concept of a
"right" to a safe and healthy workplace has driven the legislative and
regulatory machinery. Because, to a significant degree, the expansion of
occupational health law is due to lawmakers' reaction to perceived deficiencies in worker's compensation programs, any discussion of the
8 See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text.
9 See notes 181-208 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 103-36 infra and accompanying text; see also Hoyman & Stallworth, Suit Filing By
1I'omen: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 69-72 (1986).
11 See notes 137-180 hifra and accompanying text.
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
14 Because another article in this symposium will address the new application of criminal law to
occupational health issues, the authors have deferred discussion of this approach to that article. See
Magnuson & Leviton, Policy Considerationsin Cotporate CrimtinalProsecutions After People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1987).
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"new" law of employee health must begin with an overview of the aspects
of worker's compensation programs that have led to today's statutes,
rules and case law.
II.

Worker's Compensation

Prior to the enactment of state worker's compensation statutes, injured employees were entitled only to general damage recovery predicated, on employer fault.15 Moreover, recovery was uncertain at best due
to a variety of employer defenses such as contributory negligence, the
fellow servant doctrine and the assumption of risk principle.16 Even if an
employee was successful, it could take years for his case to work its way
through the state court system and the litigation costs might consume
any award.
The worker's compensation system was developed as an alternative
to tort litigation which was previously the only avenue available to injured workers seeking recompense from their employers. The system is
predicated on a no fault principle and is designed to provide an adequate
and efficient remedy to relieve the economic and social consequences
arising from employment related injury and illness. One court described
worker's compensation as:
a great compromise between employers and employe[es]. Both had
suffered under the old system; the employers by heavy judgments of
which half was opposing lawyers' booty, the workmen through the defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The
master in exchange for limited liability, was willing to pay on some
claims in the future, where in the past there had been no liability at all.
The servant was willing, not only to give up trial by jury, but to accept
he was sure to get a
far less than he had often won in court; provided
7
small sum without having to fight for it.1
Because worker's compensation is predominantly a function of state
law, there are inevitable variations among the many compensation programs throughout the United States. Nevertheless, certain elements are
common to all worker's compensation programs. These are:
Compulsory application of the worker's compensation principle to certain specific employments;
Liability based solely on the work connection and not on fault;
Benefits according to a prescribed schedule for injury or death;
Rate of compensation keyed to the earning power of the employee;
Provision for exclusive employer liability under the program;
Compulsory insurance for or proof of financial responsibility by the
employer; and,
Administration of the program outside the court system through
agency or commission proceedings.
The exclusive remedy doctrine is at the heart of worker's compensation systems. Under this doctrine, the schedule of benefits in a worker's
15 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 3, at 568-76 (5th ed. 1984).
16 Id.
17 Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916).
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compensation statute is the sole and exclusive remedy of an employee
against his employer and certain others such as coworkers and the employer's insurer.'s In other words, if an employee receives a work related
injury, his exclusive remedy will be the benefits scheduled under the applicable worker's compensation program. This is true even if the injured
employee never applied for worker's compensation benefits or was time
barred from doing so.' 9
Worker's compensation has functioned effectively when injury is
traumatic. However, critics claim that while the requisite nexus between
the injury and the work which is easily established in the case of the traumatic injury (such as the loss of a finger or death resulting from being
crushed by a falling object) it is not as easily established when chronic
illness or disease is alleged to result from occupational factors. These
critics argue that long latency periods between exposure and symptoms
often increase the employees' burden in establishing work relatedness or
meeting some state worker's compensation statutes of limitation. They
further argue that the potential for synergistic effects from multiple exposures which may be both occupational and nonoccupational further
complicates a compensation board's resolution of the questions of liability and damages (consider, for example, the case of a miner who smokes
three packs of cigarettes a day). Critics also argue that the mobility of the
work force further complicates the worker's burden of proof because he
may not be able to identify the specific exposure(s) and thus employer(s)
responsible for the illness or disease. This is particularly true in view of
long latency periods between exposure and symptoms of chronic diseases. Some critics additionally maintain that even state of the art toxicology and epidemiology studies of chemicals and workplaces are
inadequate, thereby complicating an already burdensome situation for
employees with alleged occupational disease; the proof problems engendered by lack of exhaustive testing, however, exist equally for other alternatives to compensation. 20
18 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986) (emphasis added):
Mo common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker
or any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide
safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees or
any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his
duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any
employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to anyone wholly or partially dependent upon
him, the legal representative of his estate, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
for such injury.
However, a number of states provide statutory immunity to the employer only. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 72.10 (1982).
19 Sedore v. Sayre, 119 N.Y.S. 2d 204 (1953). See also Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972); Woodell v. Washington Steel Corp., 269 F. Supp. 958
(W.D. Pa. 1967); Campbell v. Waggoner, 235 Ark. 374, 360 S.W.2d 124 (1962); Roberts v. Epicure
Foods Co., 330 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1960); Kane v. Durotest Corp., 37 NJ. 552, 182 A.2d 559 (1962);
Rizio v. Globe Trucking Co., 58 N.J. Super. 440, 156 A.2d 481 (1959); Durso v. Modern Biscuit
Corp., I1 A.D.2d 1036, 205 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1960); D'Anofrio v. Hatten, 25 Misc. 2d 346. 206
N.Y.S.2d 494 (1960); Brinker v. City of Greensburg. 409 Pa. 110, 185 A.2d 593 (1962).
20 Because the interface between scientific evidence and legal causation is potentially present in
every legal proceeding in which causation of a chronic illness is at issue, it deserves particular attention. As noted above, one of the catalysts for the expansion of occupational safety and health law is
our society's increasing awareness of health and healthy environments. This awareness has spawned
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All states now provide general compensation coverage for occupational diseases. For the most part, an occupational disease means "any
disease arising out of exposure to harmful conditions of employment,
when those conditions are present in a peculiar or increased degree by
comparison with employment generally." 2' Variations do occur, however, from state to state. For example, the concept of compensable occupational disease varies from the following statutory definition:
In this Act the term "occupational disease" means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment or which has become
aggravated and rendered disabling as a result of the exposure of the
employment. Such aggravation shall arise out of a risk peculiar to or
increased
by the employment and not common to the general
22
public;
to a list of specific diseases with a final catchall category affording cover23
age for "any occupational diseases" without further definition.
In some states, there is no recovery for partial disability, i.e., only
total disability and death are compensable.2 4 In other states, the converse is true; thus, in these states, if benefits are paid for partial disability,
no additional benefits will be permitted when further disability arises as a
chronic disease (such as asbestosis or byssinosis). 2 5 In still other states
disability must be manifested in a limited period from the date of exposure 2 6 or there must be a minimum period of exposure before recovery is
permitted.2 7 Some worker's compensation statutes place upper limits on
compensable medical costs which workers argue are unrealistically low
for prolonged illness due to occupational disease. 28 Although variations
among the states are inevitable with respect to matters traditionally
within the purview of state law, it has been, in part, the variety in comregulations requiring health-effects testing which, along with voluntary industry testing programs,
have led to increased testing of chemical substances for chronic health effects in laboratory animals.
That testing is frequently performed with doses of chemicals that far exceed (e.g., by 100 to 100,000
times) exposures that humans experience in the environment or in the workplace. Our ability to test
at relatively huge doses, to detect a chronic effect in animals exposed at those doses (which effect can
in some circumstances be due not to a direct effect of the chemical but to stress-related loss of
resistance to disease) and our increasing ability to detect smaller and smaller amounts of those
chemicals in the environment, including the workplace, has led to a scientificAegal dilemma.
Neither the worker's compensation system, the tort system nor any other compensation system was
explicitly designed to handle either uncertain scientific interpretation of laboratory test results "from
mouse to man," or unknown (and possibly nil) effects of minimal human exposure.
21 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 41.10 (1985).
22
23

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 172.36(d) (Smith-Hurd 1986) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 15 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.

§ 4123 (Anderson 1980).
24 Holtz v. Nevada Indus. Comm'n, 94 Nev. 257, 578 P.2d 752 (1978); Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 70 Ohio St. 2d 200, 436 N.E.2d 553 (1982).
25 Comment, Relief for Asbestos Viclins:
A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 179, 183
(1983).
26 See, e.g., Graver v. Peter Lametti Constr. Co., 293 Minn. 24, 197 N.W.2d 443 (1972) (Disability
did not occur within three years as required by statute). Arizona and Pennsylvania also have statutes
of limitation based on time of actual exposure instead of knowledge of exposure, knowledge of
illness or appearance of symptoms.
27 Smith v. Workers' Compensation Court, 618 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 142.36(d) (Smith-Hurd 1986).
28 For example, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and Vermont expressly restrict the amount of recovery for asbestos and other dust related diseases.
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pensation statutes and in other state safety and health legislation that has
led employees and their representatives to pursue other legal remedies
to address safety and health in the workplace. Their efforts have given
rise not only to the enactment of new statutes and the promulgation of
new regulations, but also to the development of new legal theories or the
revision of old ones to address these issues.
III. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
The underlying premise of the OSH Act 2 9 is "to assure so far as
possible every workingman and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources .... -30 The
Act, which is unquestionably the preeminent prophylactic statutory and
regulatory response to worker health and safety, 3 1 is designed to achieve
29

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).

30 Id. § 651(b).
31 That Congress intended the OSH Act to be a preventive statutory response to occupational
safety and health is clear from its statement of purpose as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982):
Congressional statement of findings and declaration of purpose and policy
(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations
impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of
lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments.
(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations and to provide
for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources(1) by encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate
employers and employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working conditions;
(2) by providing that employers and employees have separate but dependent responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and healthful working conditions;
(3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to business affecting interstate commerce, and by creating
an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for carring out adjudicatory
functions under this chapter;
(4) by building upon advances already made through employer and employee initiative
for providing safe and healthful working conditions;
(5) by providing for research in the field of occupational safety and health, including
the psychological factors involved, and by developing innovative methods, techniques,
and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems;
(6) by exploring ways to discover latent diseases, establishing causal connections between diseases and work in environmental conditions, and conducting other research
relating to health problems, in recognition of the fact that occupational health standards present problems often different from those involved in occupational safety;
(7) by providing medical criteria which will assure insofar as practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of
his work experience;
(8) by providing for training programs to increase the number and competence of personnel engaged in the field of occupational safety and health;
(9) by providing for the development and promulgation of occupational safety and
health standards;
(10) by providing an effective enforcement program which shall include a prohibition
against giving advance notice of any inspection and sanctions for any individual violating this prohibition;
(11) by encouraging the States to assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement their occupational safety and health laws by providing grants to
the States to assist in identifying their needs and responsibilities in the area of occupational safety and health, to develop plans in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, to improve the administration and enforcement of State occupational saflty
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its goal of safer workplaces by authorizing the promulgation of health
and safety standards, providing the machinery for enforcing those standards, and protecting workers who protest against allegedly unsafe workplace conditions. This protection even applies where such protests do
not involve contact with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). The OSH Act has broad coverage, encompassing all
employers who have one or more employees and who are engaged in a
business affecting commerce 3 2 unless the 33employer is in a category expressly excluded from the Act's coverage.
Generally, safety and health standards are promulgated under the
OSH Act through an administrative rulemaking procedure. 34 The suggestion for promulgation of a standard may come from inside of OSHA
itself, from a recommendation by the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), 3 5 from a union or from interested parties
such as employers and employees. 3 6 Interested parties are permitted to
and health laws, and to conduct experimental and demonstration projects in connection therewith;
(12) by providing for appropriate reporting procedures with respect to occupational
safety and health which procedures will help achieve the objectives of this chapter and
accurately describe the nature of the occupational safety and health problems;
(13) by encouraging joint labor-management efforts to reduce injuries and disease
arising out of employment.
32 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1982). Given the historically broad interpretation of this criterion, as a
practical matter the OSH Act covers almost every private employer in any state or territory of the
United States unless expressly excluded by the Act.
33 OSHA has excluded from coverage professionals such as doctors and lawyers, charities,
churches, household domestics, Indians, agricultural workers and trainees. See Donovan v. Navajo
Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1975.1 to 1975.6 (1985). Federal
agencies are also excluded from OSH Act coverage although 29 U.S.C. § 668 (1982) requires such
agencies to establish and maintain their own occupational safety and health programs. State and
political subdivisions are similarly excluded from coverage, 29 U.S.C. § 652(5), as are employers
over which other federal agencies "exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or
regulations affecting occupational safety or health." 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1).
34 For a two year period following the effective date of the OSH Act, OSHA was authorized to
adopt any national consensus or federal safety and health standard without the necessity of proceeding with formal rulemaking. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1982).
35 NIOSH was established along with OSHA by the OSH Act to function, inter alia, as OSHA's
research source and to assist in identifying the need for and the development of health and safety
standards. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1982).
36 For example, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, on September 19, 1986, petitioned OSHA for an emergency temporary standard covering infectious bloodborne diseases, including AIDS and hepatitis B. See 16 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 461 (Oct. 1, 1986).
Unions or other employee representatives have also brought actions against OSHA in an attempt to
force the Agency to promulate a standard. For example, in 1972 the National Congress of Hispanic
Am. Citizens ("NCHAC") petitioned OSHA for, inter alia, a field sanitation standard. When OSHA
did not do so, in 1973 the NCHAC brought suit against the agency to compel issuance of the standard. The appellate court ruled that the OSH Act's time limits for standards promulgation were not
mandatory and that it was within OSHA's discretion to determine the priorities for standards promulgation so long as the agency acts in good faith. The court did, however, hold that the NCHAC
was entitled to some timetable for the field sanitation standard, although such timetable was not
binding. National Congress of Hispanic Am. Citizens v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
This case was settled in 1982 when OSHA agreed to complete the promulgation process although it
did not admit that it had any legally mandated obligation to do so. National Congress of Hispanic
Am. Citizens v. Donovan, 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (D.D.C. 1985). In Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the appellate court ordered OSHA to
expedite issuance of a permanent standard for occupational exposure to ethylene oxide ("EtO").
The court concluded that, in light of the evidence showing a health hazard from EtO exposure,
OSHA's delay in promulgating a standard was unreasonable.

976
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express their views on a proposed standard through written submissions
as well as oral testimony at hearings.
OSHA enforces its standards through a system of workplace inspections, citations and monetary penalties. 3 7 The consistent holdings of
courts that there is no private right of action permitted under the Act by
employees who claim they have been injured due to an employer's violation of the OSH Act or a standard promulgated thereunder are further
38
proof that the statute is preventive in nature.
Despite allegations that the Agency's standard setting procedures
are lengthy and cumbersome, or that under some administrations
OSHA's activities have not been properly focused, no one can deny that
the Agency is a significant and positive force in protecting worker health
and safety. Moreover, while the focus of much early activity under the
OSH Act was in the area of safety-which encompasses most of the current day to day OSHA enforcement activities-the last decade has seen
the Agency shift the emphasis in the standard setting area from safety to
employee health.
OSHA's efforts in connection with exposure to potentially toxic substances in the workplace have taken several directions. First, the Agency
has published workplace exposure limits for several hundred "Air Contaminants", including eight hour time weighted averages ("TWA") and
ceiling levels. 39 Second, OSHA has promulgated comprehensive standards for individual chemicals in an effort to regulate, in a more detailed
fashion, other potentially toxic substances. 40 These comprehensive stan37 The OSH Act and the U.S. Code also provide for criminal sanctions in the following situations: Willful violations causing death; giving unauthorized advance notice of inspections; giving
false information to OSHA; killing, assaulting or hampering the work of an OSHA compliance officer. See OSHA's Field Operations Manual, Chap. VI(B). Criminal penalties are imposed by the
courts after trials and are not imposed by OSHA or the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, id.
38 See, e.g., Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974); Skidmore v. Traveler's Ins., 356 F.
Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
39 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1986) (Tables Z-l, Z-2, and Z-3).
40

See 29 C.F.R. §§ :

1910.1001
1910.1003
1910.1004
1910.1006
1910.1007
1910.1008
1910.1009
1910.1010
1910.1011
1910.1012
1910.1013
1910.1014
1910.1015
1910.1016
1910.1017
1910.1018
1910.1025
1910.1028
1910.1029
1910.1043
1910.1044

Asbestos, tremolite, anthophyllite, and actinolite
4-Nitrobiphenyl
alpha-Naphthylamine
Methyl chloromethyl ether
3,3'-Dichlorobenzidine (and its salts)
bis-Chloromethyl ether
beta-Naphthylamine
Benzidine
4-Aminodiphenyl
Ethyleneimine
beta-Propiolactone
2-Acetylaminofluorene
4-Dimethylaminoazobenzene
N-Nitrosodimethylamine
Vinyl chloride
Inorganic arsenic
Lead
Benzene
Coke oven emissions
Cotton dust
1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane
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dards articulate engineering, work practice, hygiene, training, personal
protective equipment, monitoring, record keeping and/or medical requirements as well as permissible exposure levels. Third, even if a substance is not expressly regulated by a standard, OSHA may cite an
employer under the OSH Act's General Duty clause which obligates employers to: "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing4or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." '
In addition to promulgating a greater number of substance specific
health standards in recent years, OSHA has made increasing use of the
General Duty clause to cite employers for allowing exposure of workers
to potentially toxic substances. It is difficult to determine
whether this proliferation of General Duty clause citations in areas
where there has been no effort by OSHA to promulgate a standard
stems from OSHA's desire to avoid the lengthy court battle that standard-setting inevitably engenders or whether OSHA questions its ability to withstand a sophisticated industry challenge to a particular
proposed standard. However, even assuming OSHA's good intentions in trying to protect employees who may be exposed to toxins,
nonetheless, the agency's use of the General Duty
clause in this area is
42
often highly questionable and impracticable.
At best, OSHA has had variable success in attempting to use the General
Duty clause to regulate what it believes to be employee overexposure to
an unregulated potentially toxic substance or to dictate engineering
con43
trols and work practices not mandated by any standard.
In Toms River Chemical Corp. ,44 OSHA relied on a NIOSH ceiling recommendation for occupational exposure to phosgene gas as the basis for
establishing a "recognized hazard" under the Genral Duty clause. The
1910.1045 Acrylonitrile
1910.1047 Ethylene oxide
1910.1101 Asbestos
41 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). Because of the "catch all" nature of the General Duty clause,
OSHA bears a far different burden of proof to enforce a citation on that basis than is the case with
the more specific safety standards. To establish that an employer has violated the General Duty
clause, OSHA must show that an employee was exposed to an existing hazard, that exposure to the
hazard was likely to cause death or serious physical harm, that the hazard was foreseeable, and that
the hazard is one of which the employer had actual knowledge or which is recognized as a hazard in
the employer's industry. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The hazard must also be preventable.
42 Stillman and Duffee, Using the GeneralDuly Clause as a "Super Standard," in Vol. XXXIX PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT:

LABOR RELATIONS

(1981).

43 See, e.g., Marshall v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1978); Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974); Minn-Dak Farmers Coop., 7
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1667 (1979); Spencer Leathers, 5 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1484 (1977); Stepan Chem.
Co., 5 O.S.H Cas. (BNA) 1367 (1977). See further OSHA's citations of hospitals and dental clinics
under the General Duty clause for what the Agency deemed to be overexposure to an anesthetic gas,
nitrous oxide. OSHA argued that the justification for these citations arose from reports in the medical and scientific literature concerning excessive miscarriages and birth defects among operating
room personnel, and relied on a 1977 NIOSH criteria document that recommended a 25 parts per
million ("ppm") TWA per operation exposure limit. Charles S. Wilson Memorial Hosp., OSHRC
Doc. No. 80-1758; Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center, OSHRC Doc. No. 79-7155; South
Suburban Hosp., OSHRC Doc. No. 79-5444.
44 OSHRC Doc. Nos. 76-5197 and 76-5282 (1978).
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Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") 4 5 rejected this effort, holding that a NIOSH criteria document alone did not
prove that exceedence of the ceiling levels it recommended were recognized as hazardous in the defending employer's industry.
One area where OSHA has used the General Duty clause is to cite
employers who implemented policies to protect the developing fetus.
The Agency took this action because it believed these policies resulted in
female employees undergoing surgical sterilizations in order to keep
their jobs. Such actions, however, have not met with success. 4 6 In Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers InternationalUnion v. American Cyanamid Co. ,'47
the appellate court held that the word "hazard" in the General Duty
clause was intended to cover only physical workplace conditions and
could not be stretched to reach the consequences of a corporate policy
that excluded fertile women from certain workplaces.
In addition to standard setting, enforcement activities in connection
with those standards, and the use of the General Duty clause, OSHA's
efforts in connection with workplace health risks have taken a fourth direction, i.e., the education of employees by requiring dissemination of
information regarding potential occupational health risks. This approach is primarily codified in two Agency standards: The Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records Standard promulgated in 198048
and the Hazard Communication Standard promulgated in 1983. 49 The
former authorizes and regulates employee, union, and OSHA access to
employer-maintained medical and exposure records. The latter sets out
a comprehensive system for communicating information regarding hazardous substances in the workplace to employees through work force
training, labeling of materials, and material safety data sheet ("MSDS")
preparation and dissemination. These two informational standards are
premised on the belief (a) that employees are entitled to know about
health risks to which they may be exposed and (b) that given such information, they will be in a position to make informed decisions concerning
both the safe handling of workplace chemicals and their willingness to
work in potentially harmful environments.
Both employers and employees will probably enjoy favorable longterm results from the two informational standards. From the employer's
standpoint, compliance with the Hazard Communication Standard
should help ensure satisfaction of the common law duty to adequately
warn about product risks-a basic element of many products liability lawsuits 5 0-because of the standard's requirements concerning preparation
45 OSHRC is an independent federal adjudicative agency which hears citation contests brought
under the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982).
46 American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596 (1981); Bunker Hill Company, OSHRC Doc.
No. 80-6139.
47 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1986).
49 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986); see Tyson, The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA HazardCommunication
Standard on State and Community Right to Know Laws, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1010 (1987).
50 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Stromsodt v.
Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), alf'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
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and dissemination to immediate customers of MSDSs containing risk information. 5 ' Thus, employers will reduce their exposure to legal liability. Similarly, compliance with the medical records access rule should
reduce the potential for tort claims from a company's employees based
on one of the current "withholding of health hazard information" theories developed in the asbestos litigation. 5 2 From the employee's standpoint, the two informational standards are educational tools that permit
the employee to evaluate what risks he is willing to bear in a particular
job and to try to effect changes, e.g., through his union, if he desires. If
an employee elects to remain in a particular job that presents potential
health or safety risks, an understanding of those risks should lead to his
greater care in following suppliers' handling and industrial hygiene recommendations on labels and MSDSs; further, such knowledge and understanding may lead him individually, in conjunction with his employer,
coworkers, union,5 3 or an appropriate government agency such as
OSHA, 54 to take action to ameliorate significant
risks to the extent tech55
nologically and/or economically feasible.
51 Although compliance with government safety standards has historically not been an absolute
bar to liability for a third party's negligent conduct, adherence to regulations concerning hazard
communication arguably deserve favorable consideration by the judiciary with regard to alleged liability for failure to adequately warn. A chemical supplier that provides his industrial customers with
information as required by the standard not only evidences his intention to comply with the law and
warn the customer, and thus the customer's employees of his product's dangers, but provides evidence of good corporate citizenship as well. Moreover, the requirement that recipients of MSDSs
pass on the risk information to their customers should relieve the manufacturer (who generated the
MSDS) of any duty to warn remote users.
52 See notes 192-95 infra and accompanying text.
53 See notes 137-80 infra and accompanying text.
54 Employees who complain to OSHA about alleged unsafe working conditions are protected
from employer retaliation by the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1982). See also Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
55 The concept of feasibility under the OSH Act comes, in part, from 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)
(1982). The statute provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations,
experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, thefeasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other health safety laws. Whenever practicable, the
standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desires.
Id. (emphasis added).
Cases interpreting the meaning of feasibility under the OSH Act have uniformaly concluded that
the term encompasses technological feasibility, although there is disagreement among courts as to
whether that means immediately technologically feasible, i.e., achievable, or feasible in the near future through improvements in existing technologies or the development of the new technologies.
See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1979); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 97 (1981);
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Admin., 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. non, Firestone Plastics Co. v.
Department of Labor, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub non., American Textiles
Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). The component of economic feasibility comes
from the legislative history and was endorsed in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also statements of Senator Saxbe (116
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The enactment of the OSH Act in 1970 was the first major expansion of occupational health and safety law since establishment of
worker's compensation in the early part of this century. While the OSH
Act's very name suggests its preeminence in the field of occupational
health law, its passage did not preempt the field but, rather, opened the
door to other statutory, regulatory and common law developments.
The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1977
56
On January 1, 1977 the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
went into effect, and provided the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) with broad authority to regulate the manufacture, import, processing, distribution, use, and disposal of chemical substances. Although
some chemicals (such as tobacco products, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, and pesticides) are excluded from TSCA coverage,5 7 the Act authorizes the Agency under certain circumstances to reach into workplaces
and other environments to regulate potentially harmful exposure to
nonexcluded chemical substances. The EPA has promulgated rules
under TSCA regulating not only certain chemical manufacture and
processing, but also affecting other workplaces such as school buildings
that contain asbestos. 58 Inasmuch as TSCA prohibits the domestic manufacture or import into the United States of any new commercial chemical substance prior to Agency review 5 9 the Act is in a sense a "chemical
substances control act" rather than merely a "toxic substances control
act." Moreover, because the Act permits citizens to petition the Agency
to issue, amend, or repeal a TSCA rule or order, 60 and to initiate civil
IV.

CONG. REC. 36,512 (1970)). With respect to economic feasibility, the Supreme Court has held that
OSHA is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis when promulgating standards under 29
U.S.C. § 656(b)(5) (1982). However, OSHA may conduct such a cost-benefit analysis if it wishes to
do so as part of its economic feasibility determination. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
57 TSCA § 3(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (1982).
58 In response to public concerns about asbestos, EPA has issued several regulations under
TSCA concerning the substance. The first regulation, which became effective on June 28, 1982 was
for the purpose of protecting school employees and students. The rule required all local education
agencies to inspect all areas of each school building for friable (i.e., crumbly) materials; to take samples of each type of friable material found; and to have those samples analyzed for their asbestos
content. Each local education agency was also required to keep a record of the findings of all inspections, samplings, and analyses. If asbestos is found in a school, the local education agency is required to provide information to certain employees, and to notify the parent-teacher association or
the parents directly. The "Asbestos in Schools Regulation" was published as a final rule at 47 Fed.
Reg. 23,369 (1982) on May 27, 1982, and is codified at 40 C.F.R. § 763.10OF (1986).
59 Under TSCA § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1) (1982), a Premanufacture Notification, or
"PMN," must be submitted to EPA at least 90 days prior to commercial manufacture or import of
any chemical substance that is not on a list of chemicals in commerce that is compiled and maintained by the Agency. This list is known as the "TSCA Inventory of Chemical Substances," and was
compiled pursuant to § 8(b) of the Act. The Inventory consists of all commercial chemical substances initially compiled by EPA pursuant to § 8(b), plus all commercial chemicals which have
passed PMN review under § 5. With regards to chemicals for which a PMN must be submitted, the
Agency can impose restrictions on manufacture, import, processing, and other activities under authority of TSCA §§ 5(e) and 5(f).
60 TSCA § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (1982) provides, in relevant part, that "[any person may petition the Administrator to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule
under section 4, 6, or 8 or an order under section 5(e) or 6(b)(2) ...."
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suits against employers to restrain violations, 6 1 labor interests have discovered that TSCA provides a vehicle for initiating action by the federal
government and for helping control significant chemical risks in the
workplace.
The potential role of TSCA in protecting employees from unreasonable health risks was considered during the Congressional hearings that
preceded and helped shape the Act. In addition to hearing reports of
cancer deaths related to exposures to certain workplace chemicals, 6 2 Senate and House committees received testimony from labor organizations
concerning the need for legislation to adequately protect health in the
workplace. One union representative, for example, addressed chronic
health risks in a draconian fashion, and the relationship between TSCA
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act:
Unfortunately, at this time our primary method of identifying hazardous substances is counting the bodies that they leave behind. I fear
that we will be counting a great deal of bodies in the coming years
since the 10- to 30-year latency period that apparently often exists for
the manifestation of cancer is coming of age with regard to the chemical barrage we have subjected ourselves to in the past several decades.
It is in [the area of] identifying and preventing hazards before injury is
done, that we feel the Toxic Substances Control Act is most essential,
and in which we feel it should be closely coordinated with the [Occu63
pational Safety and Health Administration] control mechanisms.
The witness further recommended that toxic substances should be
controlled before "an investment commitment is made and an industrial
64
process is initiated and before there is loss of human life or health."
Recognizing the increasing reliance by federal agencies on the results of health-effects testing using laboratory animals in the assessment
of human risk, the AFL-CIO asked that priority for testing be given to
chemicals that may present occupational risks, and that any testing program under TSCA be coordinated with NIOSH and OSHA. 65 The AFLCIO along with other labor interests also voiced approval of statutory
provisions designed to protect employees against discrimination or job
loss that might result from employee assistance in enforcing the provi61

TSCA § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982) states, in relevant part, that:
[Any person may commence a civil action (1) against any person including (A) the United States, and (B) any other government
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution who is alleged to be in violation of this Act or any rule promulgated under
section 4, 5, or 6 or order issued under section 5 to restain such violation, or
(2) against the Administrator to compel the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this Act which is not discretionary.
62 The Senate Subcommittee on the Environment of the Committee on Commerce heard testimony, for instance, concerning cancer deaths of chemical plant workers allegedly resulting from
exposure to his (chloromethyl) ether. The testimony was presented to illustrate the need for pretesting chemicals before allowing exposure during manufacture.
63 Testimony ofJohn J. Sheehan, United Steelworkers of America ALF-CIO, Hearingson S. 776
Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
quoted in R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 15 (BNA) (1977) [hereinafter Toxic SUBSTANCE CONTROL ACT].
64

Toxic SUBSTANCE CONTROL ACT,supra note 63, at 20.

65

Id.
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sions of the Act. 66

Any review of TSCA must necessarily include a discussion of the
concept of unreasonable risk. This concept is central to TSCA, and findings concerning unreasonable risk are a prerequisite to most EPA regulatory action under the statute. Although the term "unreasonable risk" is
not defined in the Act, section 2(c) and the legislative history make it
clear that a balancing approach, including the economic effects of regula67
tion, is to be used in determining what constitutes unreasonable risk.
The Act generally requires that before regulatory action under TSCA can
be taken with regard to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator of the EPA must make certain findings in the administrative record
concerning unreasonable risk to health or the environment. Evidence
that the Administrator may use to support his findings includes results of
laboratory animal toxicology studies and epidemiology studies, even
though those types of studies do not prove with certainty that a risk to
human health from exposure to the chemical substance or mixture does
in fact exist. The degree of certainty that the Administrator must have
with regard to whether the risk is unreasonable varies with the type of
regulatory action. Congress required less certainty for regulations that it
expected to have less adverse impact on affected companies (e.g., requirements promulgated under section four requiring companies to test
chemicals they manufacture or process for adverse health or environ66 Employee protection is now ensured by TSCA's § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982), which provides, in relevant part, that:
No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee
with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)
has-

(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be
commenced a proceeding under this Act;
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding; or
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a
proceeding or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this Act.
67 Section 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c) (1982), of TSCA provides that:
It is the intent of Congress that the Administrator shall carry out this Act in a reasonable and prudent manner, and that the Administrator shall consider the environmental,
economic, and social impact of any action the Administrator takes or proposes to take
under this Act.
The Report of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives reveals that any definition of "unreasonable risk" was intentionally omitted from the Act:
During the hearings, a number of witnesses recommended that the bill include a definition
of unreasonable risk. Because the determination of unreasonable risk involves a consideration of probability, severity, and similar factors which cannot be defined in precise terms
and is not a factual determination but rather requires the exercise ofjudgment on the part
of the person making it, the Committee did not attempt a definition of such risk. In general, a determination that a risk associated with a chemical substance or mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability that harm will occur and the magnitude and
severity of that harm against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the availability to
society of the benefits of the substance or mixture, taking into account the availability of
substitutes for the substance or mixture which do not require regulation, and other adverse
effects which such proposed action may have on society. The balancing process described
above does not require a formal benefit-cost analysis under which a monetary value is assigned to the risks associated with a substance and to the cost to society of proposed regulatory action on the availability of such benefits. Because a monetary value often cannot be
assigned to a benefit or cost, such an analysis would not be very useful.
H. R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
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mental effects), but required more certainty for regulations that it expected would have greater adverse impact (e.g., regulations promulgated
under section 6 banning or restricting certain chemical substances and
mixtures). Thus, for some regulatory actions the Administrator need
only present evidence in the administrative record sufficient to support a
finding that a substance or mixture "may present" an unreasonable risk,
while for other actions the evidence in the record must support a finding
that the substance or mixture "presents or will present" an unreasonable
68
risk.
The EPA uses TSCA to control potential risks from chemicals in the
workplace in several ways. First, under TSCA section 5 no person may
manufacture a new chemical substance, 6 9 or manufacture or process an
existing chemical substance for a "significant new use," unless that person submits to the EPA a notice of intent to do so at least ninety days
prior to commencing such manufacture or processing. 70 The Agency's
review of premanufacture and significant new use notifications can reveal
health or environmental risks which EPA is empowered to respond to by
issuing orders under sections 5(e) or 5(f) of the Act, which can prohibit
or restrict the chemical's manufacture, processing, distribution, use or
disposal. The "may present" standard is applicable to section 5(e) orders, while the "presents or will present" standard applies to section 5(0
orders. 7 1 Such orders are applicable only to the person who submitted
68 There is a parallel between TSCA and the OSH Act with regard to the risk determinations
that are required prior to regulation. As provided in § 6 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982) ("Regulation of Hazardous Chemical Substances and Mixtures"):
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, presents or will present an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment, the Administrator shall by rule apply ... requirements to such substance or mixture to the extent necessary to protect adequately
against such risk using the least burdensome requirements ....
The OSH Act, on the other hand, requires that before a health standard can be promulgated,
OSHA must demonstrate the existence of a "significant risk," and must also demonstrate that the
contemplated standard will reduce that risk. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
No court has yet been faced with deciding the relationship between a "significant risk" under
the OSH Act and an "unreasonable risk" under TSCA. Thus it is possible that a potential workplace
health risk may meet the risk criteria for action under one of the two acts but not under the other.
69 See supra text accompanying note 59.
70 The "Premanufacture Notification" rules promulgated under TSCA § 5 apply to all nonexcluded commercial chemical substances and are codified 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.1 to 720.122 (1986).
"Significant New Use Rules" (or "SNURs") under § 5 are promulgated for individual chemical substances under criteria that are specified in § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2):
A determination by the Administrator that a use of a chemical substance is a significant
new use with respect to which [90-day] notification is required ... shall be made by a rule
promulgated after consideration of all relevant factors, including(A) the projected volume of manufacturing and processing of a chemical substance,
(B) the extent to which a use changes the type or form ofexposure ofhuman beings or
the environment to a chemical substance,
(C) the extent to which a use increases the magnitude and duration of exposure of
human beings or the environment to a chemical substance, and
(D) the reasonably anticipated manner and methods of manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, and disposal of a chemical substance.
All SNURs are codified at 40 CFR §§ 721.1 to 721.1125 (1986).
71 Section 5(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (1982) ("Regulation Pending Development of Information") provides, in relevant part, that:
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the PMN or the significant new use notice. Several section 5(e) and 5(f)
orders have included requirements concerning workplace practices (including hazard communication requirements) and worker exposure.
Typically, a new chemical substance that is selected for action under section 5(e) is subsequently regulated with a SNUR that has the same provisions as the section 5(e) order. This procedure assures that all
subsequent manufacturers of the new chemical substance are subject to
the same restrictions as the manufacturer submitting the original section
5 notice (i.e., the original manufacturer).
In addition to imposing workplace controls on new chemical substances that either may present or do (or will) present an unreasonable
risk, 7 2 the Agency has promulgated regulations (including industrial hygiene sampling requirements and hazard communication rules) to control risks to employees presented by certain existing chemicals.
Although the number of existing chemicals regulated under section 6 of
the Act ("Regulation of Hazardous Chemical Substances and Mixtures")
is far exceeded by the number of new chemicals regulated pursuant to
section 5(e) and 5(f) orders, the Agency's section 6 rules designed to
have had a significant impact on many of the nareduce chemical risks
73
tion's workplaces.
Section 4 of TSCA authorizes the EPA to require testing of chemicals for health and environmental effects, and is thus a powerful agency
tool for the development of information that can lead to regulations
If the Administrator determines that(i) the information available to the Administrator is insufficient to permit a reasoned
evaluation of the health and environmental effects of a chemical substance with respect
to which [90-day] notice is required ...; and
(ii) (I) in the absence of sufficient information to permit the Administrator to make
such an evaluation, the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or
disposal of such substance, or any combination of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, or
(II) such substance is or will be produced in substantial quantities, and such substance
either enters or may reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in substantial
quantities or there is or may be significant or substantial human exposure to the substance, the Administrator may issue a proposed order, to take effect on the expiration
of the notification period applicable to the manufacturing or processing of such substance ... to prohibit or limit the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce,
use, or disposal of such substance or to prohibit or limit any combination of such activities ....

Id. (emphasis added).
Section 5(0, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (1982) ("Protection Against Unreasonable Risks") states as
follows:
If the Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance with
respect to which [90-day] notice is required ... or that any combination of such activities,
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment before a rule
promulgated under Section 6 can protect against such risk, the Administrator shall, before
the expiration of the notification period applicable ...to the manufacturing or processing
of such substance, take the action authorized.., to the extent necessary to protect against
such risk.
Id. (emphasis added).
72 See supra text accompanying note 71.
73 Rules under TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982), promulgated as of December 31, 1986 affect
the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use and/or disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), certain metalworking fluids, fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes (i.e., CFCs
thought to be responsible for some depletion of the earth's ozone layer), and asbestos.
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designed to protect employee health, public health, and the environment. Manufacturers, importers and processors of the chemicals for
which testing requirements have been promulgated are required to test
the chemicals at their own expense or to otherwise ensure that the required testing is done. Congress has specified the criteria which govern
the EPA's decisions concerning chemical testing in section 4(a) of the
Act.
TSCA establishes a mechanism whereby chemical substances and
mixtures are "designated" to the Administrator for testing by an Interagency Testing Committee (ITC), which was established pursuant to section 4(e). The Committee consists of eight members, all of whom are
government employees, including one member each from the Department of Labor and NIOSH. 74 Within twelve months following ITC
designation, the Administrator of the EPA is required to provide opportunity for public comment on the chemicals that were designated by the
Committee and to either (1) initiate a rulemaking proceeding requiring
testing or (2) publish in the Federal Register the reasons for not initiating rulemaking. 75 Results of laboratory toxicology testing can be used in
Agency risk assessments, and thus can provide part of the factual basis
for unreasonable risk determinations that are prerequisite to promulgat76
ing regulations or issuing orders.
74 Pursuant to TSCA § 4(e)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(2)(A) (1982), the ITC's membership is as
follows:
(i) One member appointed by the Administrator from the Environmental Protection
Agency.
(ii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Labor from officers or employees of the
Department of Labor engaged in the Secretary's activities under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970.
(iii) One member appointed by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality
from the Council or its officers or employees.
(iv) One member appointed by the Director of the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health from officers or employees of the Institute.
(v) One member appointed by the Director of the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences from officers or employees of the Institute.
(vi) One member appointed by the Director of the National Cancer Institute from officers
or employees of the Institute.
(vii) One member appointed by the Director of the National Science Foundation from oficers or employees of the Foundation.
(viii) One member appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from officers or employees of
the Department of Commerce.
75 TSCA § 4(e)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(B) (1982). The ITC can also recommend chemicals without designating them. The list of designated chemicals (i.e., those which are subject to the
12-month response requirement) is limited to 50 substances and mixtures at any one time. TSCA
§ 4(e)(l)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(A).
76 In Fiscal Year 1985, EPA took a total of 21 ITC-related actions. These resulted in 3 final test
rules, 6 proposed rules, 2 advanced notices of proposed rulemaking, and 10 decisions not to test. Of
the 21 actions, 19 addressed designated chemicals, while 2 were actions on chemicals recommended
by ITC but not designated for response within 12 months. In an effort to accelerate chemical testing, the Agency undertook during the early years of TSCA to negotiate testing agreements with
industry in lieu of going through the lengthy process of promulgating test rules. This practice,
however, was not sanctioned under TSCA, in part because the agreements were not enforceable,
and in part because they did not result in other requirements under the Act that would have been
triggered by regulations requiring testing. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Subsequently, EPA promulgated regulations to provide for enforceable testing consent agreements. 40 C.F.R. §§ 790.20 to 790.28
(1986).
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Labor interests have discovered that TSCA not only provides the
EPA with broad authority to regulate and require testing of workplace
chemicals, but also that Congress has provided a means for employee
and union participation in initiating regulatory proceedings and for suing employers who are in violation of the Act or certain of its regulations
or orders. Section 21 of TSCA gives any person the right to petition the
EPA to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a
rule under TSCA sections 4, 6, or 8, or of an order under sections 5(e) or
6(b)(2). 7 7 The Agency has only ninety days to either grant or deny the
petition. If the petition is granted, the EPA is required to promptly commence the appropriate proceeding under sections 4, 5, 6, or 8. If the
petition is denied, however, the Administrator must publish the reasons
for the denial in the Federal Register. 78 Judicial remedies are available in
the event that the EPA does not act within ninety days; remedies are also
available if the Agency denies the petition and the petitioner can show
the need for the rule or order to the court's satisfaction. 7 9 Organized
labor has successfully used the section 21 petition procedure in connection with asbestos.8 0 On November 16, 1983 the Service Employees -International Union (SEIU), AFL-CIO, petitioned the EPA under TSCA
section 21 to initiate rulemaking proceedings under TSCA section 6.
SEIU sought the establishment of standards and requirements for the
inspection and abatement of asbestos in schools and other buildings.
The Agency substantially granted most of the petitioner's requests; the
1986 TSCA Amendments,8 1 however, subsequently addressed many of
the SEIU's concerns.
Section 20 of TSCA declares that anyone may file a civil lawsuit
against (1) any person (including the U.S. Government) who is alleged to
be in violation of the Act or in violation of certain regulations or orders,8 2 or (2) against the Administrator of the EPA to compel the performance of any act or duty under TSCA that is not discretionary. A
person who intends to file suit to restrain a violation must give notice to
the Administrator and to the person alleged to be in violation of the Act
at least sixty days prior to commencing the lawsuit. 8 3 Similarly, a person
who intends to file suit to compel the Administrator to perform an act or
duty that is not discretionary must notify the Administrator sixty days in
advance. However, in the event that the citizen alleges that the Adminis77 TSCA § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (1982). TSGA § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1982), sets forth
recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and provides, inter alia,
that employers must maintain
records of allegations of significant health or environmental effects, submit certain health-effects
studies to EPA, and report to EPA substantial risks of injury to health or the environment. Section
6(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(2), authorizes the Administrator to take action to prevent the manufacture or processing of a substance or mixture in a manner that unintentionally causes the chemical to
present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment.
78 TSCA § 21(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(3) (1982).
79 See TSGA §§ 21(b)(4)(A), 21(b)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. 99 2620(b)(4)(A), 2620(b)(4)(B).
80 See supra note 60.
81 Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519.
82 Specifically, TSCA § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982), authorizes civil actions against any person
alleged to be in violation of TSCA, or in violation of any rule promulgated under §§ 4, 5,or 6, or in
violation of an order issued under § 5 to restrain the violation.
83 I'SCA § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (1982). 40 CFR § 702.61 (1986).
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trator has failed to file an action under section 7 of TSCA (concerning
imminent hazards), only ten days' notice is required. The sixty-day and
ten-day notice periods are "waiting periods" between the notification
and the actual filing of the civil suit, which allow the EPA time to take
action against alleged violators or to perform the act or duty that is not
84
discretionary prior to litigation.
Two provisions of TSCA that have resulted in federal agency review
and action with respect to potential chemical risks in the workplace are
sections 4(f) and 9(a). Although Congress may not have intended those
two sections of the Act to operate together to reduce potential risks to
employee health, those authorities (which mandate accelerated or "priority" health risk review and referral of regulatory action to other federal
agencies, respectively) have provided OSHA with EPA-generated health
risk information that has lead to regulatory activity under section 6 of the
OSH Act.
Proclaiming its concern with chemicals that may cause cancer, gene
mutations or birth defects, Congress has required that the EPA initiate
appropriate action to prevent or reduce such risks upon its receipt of
information pertaining to those effects. Specifically, section 4(f) of TSCA
provides that:
Upqn the receipt of(1) any test data required to be submitted under this Act, or
(2) any other information available to the Administrator,
which indicates to the Administrator that there may be a reasonable
basis to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture presents or will
present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects, the Administrator
shall, within the 180-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of
such data or information, initiate appropriate action under section 5,
6, or 7 to prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk or publish
in the Federal Register a finding that such risk is not unreasonable
85

Section 4(f) applies only to a limited number of human health effects
and does not apply to environmental effects. This is in contrast to the
EPA's authority under other sections of the Act, which address both
health and environmental risks without further distinction as to the nature of the risks which the Agency is authorized to address. Moreover,
section 4(f) accelerated review is not mandated for all chemicals associated with the three health effects, but only for those for which the available information "indicates . . . that there may be a reasonable basis to
conclude" that the substance or mixture "presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm" from the specified health
effects. Although the term "significant risk of serious or widespread
harm" is not defined in TSCA, the EPA addressed the meaning of the
84 40 C.F.R. § 702.89 (1986). There is no requirement that the notice of intent to file suit specify the harm believed to have been caused by the violation or by the failure of the Administrator to
perform a nondiscretionary act or duty. Rather, any allegations of harm that may need to be made
are left to the civil action itself. 47 Fed. Reg. 2772 (1982).
85 TSCA § 4(0, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1982).
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term, as well as the nature of information that can trigger section 4(f)
requirements, during its accelerated review of formaldehyde:
In the case of formaldehyde, and as will be the case for many
chemicals evaluated by EPA, the Agency has started with data showing
that formaldehyde causes cancer in animals at particular dose levels
and has applied mathematical models to extrapolate from the animal
dose levels to those levels to which humans would likely be exposed.
These mathematical models give EPA an objective measurement of the
relative risks of different chemicals and, thus, provide a mechanism to
allow the Agency to set priorities. Because section 4(f) is a prioritysetting provision, EPA believes it is appropriate to use these models to
decide whether section 4(f) is triggered by a given chemical.
The application of the mathematical models to the animal data
and the extrapolation to human dose levels results in a determination
of the potential risk to individuals over their lifetimes. This is generally expressed as a probability. For example, the model extrapolations
may show that certain categories of individuals exposed to formaldehyde at a given level over a given period of time could contract cancer
with a probability of 1 X 10' which is a chance of 1 in 10,000.
The individual risk number derived from the model may then be
multiplied by the number of exposed persons believed to be exposed
to that dose level. That product provides an indication of how many
of these persons could contract cancer.
In determining whether a chemical risk may meet either statutory
test-"significant risk of serious harm," or "significant risk of widespread harm"-EPA applies the models as described. Under the "significant risk of serious harm" test, the individual risk would be high for
a population of significant size. Under the "significant risk of widespread harm" test, the individual risk calcuation may be lower, but the
large number of persons exposed would lead to a potential for a significant number of persons
in the population to be injured by the ef86
fect under consideration.
Several chemicals that have been the subject of section 4(f) accelerated review have been referred to OSHA for regulatory consideration
pursuant to TSCA section 9(a), which establishes the relationship between TSCA and federal laws not administered by the EPA. Section 9(a)
provides that if the Administrator of the EPA determines (1) that there is
a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture
presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment and (2) "in the Administrator's discretion," that the risk
may be prevented or reduced "to a sufficient extent" by action under a
federal law not administered by the EPA, the Administrator is required to
submit to the agency which administers the law a report describing the
risk and the activities that the EPA has reason to believe present the risk.
The report must include "a detailed statement of the information on
which it is based," and must request the other agency (1) to determine if
the risk "may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent" by agency
action taken under the other law and (2) (if the other agency determines
that the risk may be prevented or sufficiently reduced) to issue an order
86 49 Fed. Reg. 21,871 (1984).
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declaring whether or not the activities specified in the EPA's description
of the risk do indeed present such a risk. Also, the EPA is required to
request that the other agency respond to it with regard to the two mat87
ters specified above.
The operation of section 4(f) priority review and of the section 9(a)
referral process leading to OSHA rulemaking is illustrated by those
agencies' handling of toxicity and exposure information on 1,3-butadiene, a colorless gas with a mildly aromatic odor used predominantly as a
monomer in the producton of various types of synthetic rubbers, plastics
and resins. The present OSHA standard for 1,3-butadiene is an eighthour time weighted average of one thousand parts per million parts of
air 8 8 (ppm), and was adopted in 1971 under the authority of section 6(a)
of the OSH Act.
Faced with two animal toxicology studies demonstrating the potential for 1,3-butadiene to cause cancer in rodents, and with preliminary
information that some workers may be exposed to levels of the chemical
roughly equivalent to those that produced tumors in the experimental
animals, the EPA onJanuary 5, 1984 made the section 4(f) threshold determination that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that 1,3butadiene presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm, thus commencing the 180-day review period specified in
the Act.8 9 Although not required under TSCA or the OSH Act, OSHA
simultaneously published a request for information on the chemical
substance.9 0
Within the 180-day time frame, the EPA "initiate[d] appropriate action under section 5, 6, or 7" by issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) for a section 6 rule on May 15, 1984.91 One pur87 TSCA § 9(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(1) (1982). If the agency to which the report was made
either (1) issues an order declaring that the activity specified in EPA's description of the risk does not
present the risk described in the report, or (2) initiates within 90 days action to protect against the
risk, EPA may not take any action under TSCA §§ 6 or 7 with regard to the risk. TSCA § 9(a)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 2608(a)(2).
88 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1986) (Table Z-1).
89 1,3-Butadiene; Initiation of Accelerated Review, 49 Fed. Reg. 845 (1984).
90 Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 49 Fed. Reg. 844 (1984).
91 49 Fed. Reg. 20,524-28 (1984). In the ANPR the Agency noted that § 6 of TSCA is a vehicle
for the control of unreasonable risks, and addressed the question of what constitutes "unreasonable
risk" for purposes of regulation under the Act:
A determination of unreasonable risk under TSCA represents an administrative judgment reached by balancing the probability that harm will occur and the magnitude and
severity of that harm against the impact of regulation. Regulatory impact is evaluated in
terms of benefits provided to society by the chemical under consideration, taking into account the availability of substitutes and reasonably ascertainable economic consequences,
including effects on the national economy, small business, and technological innovation.
Thus, the existence of potential harm does not in itself constitute unreasonable risk. If the
economic or other adverse impacts of regulatory control outweigh the risk of harm, EPA
would not find the risk unreasonable.
49 Fed. Reg. at 20,526. See supra note 68.
Shortly following the EPA § 4(f) determination published on January 5, 1984, OSHA received
petitions for an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) of I ppm or less for workers exposed to
butadiene. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW), the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
and Plastic Workers of America (URW), the International Chemical Workers Union (ICWU), and the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) submitted petitions onJanuary 23, 1984. On March 7, 1984 OSHA denied the petitions on the ground that it was
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pose of the ANPR was to seek public comment on the various means by
which exposures to the chemical could be controlled, and on whether
any of the EPA's statutory authorities, or the OSH Act, provided the
most appropriate basis for regulation. Comments to the ANPR were
filed by four trade associations, two chemical companies, and one public
interest group. Generally, the trade associations and companies acknowledged the new animal toxicology risk information, but expressed
concern about the potential for over-regulation, while stating that should
any regulations concerning workplace exposure be required the appropriate agency to promulgate those regulations is OSHA. 9 2 The one public interest group that commented, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC), on the other hand, argued for employee health protection through the promulgation of EPA-mandated manufacturing and
processing controls under TSCA section 6, and also urged EPA to use its
various statutory authorities to address all human exposures to the chemical, including exposures through the atmosphere, soil and ground93
water.
On October 10, 1985 the EPA published its findings under TSCA
section 9(a), including a determination based on risk assessments that
the upper-bound lifetime risk to workers in plants that produce 1,3-butadiene and in plants that process the chemical into polymers range from
one in one (1 x 100) to one in ten thousand (1 x 10 -), depending on the
level of exposure. The EPA concluded that those risk values represent a
maximum of nine hundred extra lifetime cases of cancer in the monomer
and polymer industries. 9 4 After examining the societal benefits of butadiene, the costs to industry of controlling exposure, and the evidence
that cancer risk could be reduced through relatively inexpensive engineering controls so as to result in less than one hundred extra lifetime
cancer cases, 95 the EPA concluded that "current exposures during the
in the process of evaluating health risk data to determine whether regulatory action was appropriate.
51 Fed. Reg. 12,527 (1986).
92 See ANPR Public Record OPTS-62034 Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), Comments of the CMA's Butadiene Program Panel to EPA's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPR),July 16 and August 29, 1984; E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Comments on 1,3Butadiene, Initiation of Regulatory ActionJuly 16, 1984; International Institute of Synthetic Rubber
Producers, Inc. (IISRP), Comments on the ANPR, July 13 and August 29, 1984; Polysar Limited.
Comments on the ANPR, June 28, 1984; Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA), Comments on
the ANPR, July 16, 1984; Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, Inc. (SOCMA),
Comments on the ANPR, July 16, 1984.
93 See ANPR Public Record OPTS-62034, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC),
Comments of NRDC on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Governing Initiation of Regulatory Action on 1,3-Butadiene, July 16, 1984.
94 1,3-Butadiene; Decision to Report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 50
Fed. Reg. 41,393 (1985).
95 An element in the EPA's determination that exposure to 1,3-butadiene presents an unreasonable risk to workers was its calculation of the costs that would be incurred in reducing the risk:
The imposition of more effective engineering controls appears to be capable of reducing all workplace exposures to less than 1 ppm, thereby reducing the cancer risk to I in 100
or less and the extra lifetime cases of cancer to less than 100. The Agency's best estimate of
the industry-wide total costs of the improved engineering controls is in the range of $8
million to $21 million, expressed in current dollars. (On an annualized cost basis, these
engineering controls would cost from $1.3 million to $3.4 million per year. calculated over
a 10-year period at a 10 percent discount rate.) Accordingly, up to 800 cancers could be
avoided over a 40-year period at a total cost of$l10.000 to $26,000 per cancer case avoided.
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manufacture of 1,3-butadiene and its processing into polymers present
an unreasonable risk of injury to the health of exposed workers." 9 6 The
Agency then proceeded to make the finding required by section 9(a) that
the risk may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent by action
taken under a federal law not administered by the Administrator:
A significant concern about human exposures to 1,3-butadiene relates to inhalation of this chemical in the workplace. The OSH Act is
the primary statute for protecting the health and safety of workers,
and, as such, provides broad authorities to achieve this objective. As
discussed [above] a revised workplace standard may reduce unreasonable risks from the manufacture and processitig of 1,3-butadiene to a
sufficient extent. The requirement of such a revised workplace standard is clearly within the statutory authority of OSHA. Furthermore,
OSHA has experience and expertise in enacting and enforcing these
types of regulations. Therefore, EPA has determined that the unreasonable risk of injury to the health of exposed workers may be reduced
or prevented9 7 by actions taken by OSHA under the Federal law it
administers.
Having made the determinations required in order to issue a report
to another agency undersection 9(a), EPA requested OSHA to (1) determine if the risk described may be prevented or reduced to a sufficient
extent by action taken under the OSH Act, and (2) if so, issue an order
declaring whether or not the risk is unreasonable. The EPA asked that
OSHA respond to its request for the determination and order within 180
days .98
After soliciting public comment regarding the EPA's section 9(a) request, 9 9 OSHA published its response to the request in accordance with
section 9(a)'s requirement that "[t]he agency receiving a request under
such a report shall make the requested determination, issue the requested order, and make the requested response within such time as the
Administrator specifies in the request .... 1100
After reviewing existing health effects studies, data on worker exposure, the EPA's risk assessments, and the EPA's assessments concerning
technological feasibility of exposure control, OSHA made the following
Determination and Order pursuant to TSCA section 9(a): "'Occupational exposure to BD [butadiene] poses a risk to workers that can be
prevented or reduced to a sufficient extent by a workplace standard
promulgated and enforced by OSHA.' "101
Thus, through relatively inexpensive engineering controls, which are already in place at
some I,3-butadiene manufacturing and processing facilities, about 90 percent of the cancer
risk may be eliminated. Further risk reduction through the use of more stringent engineering control may be possible, but it appears that plant redesign would be required, thus
resulting in a significantly higher cost. The Agency does not anticipate that the cost of the
controls will have any adverse iinpact on the national economy or on small businesses.
50 Fed. Reg. 41,397 (1985).
96 Id. at 41,398.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, Request for Comments, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,952
(1985).
100 TSCA § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1982).
101 51 Fed. Reg. 12,528 (1986).
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Finally, on October 1, 1986 OSHA announced that it was "initiating
action within the meaning of section 9(a) of TSCA" by publishing an
ANPR with respect to reducing worker exposures to 1,3-butadiene under
10 2
section 6(b) of the OSH Act.
The EPA's and OSHA's handling of butadiene risk information
under sections 4(f) and 9(a) of TSCA illustrates how those two sections
of the Act have operated in tandem to reduce potential risks to employee
health. The enactment and implementation of those sections of TSCA
are thus further examples of the expansion of occupational safety and
health law.
V.

Employment Discrimination Law

The foregoing sections have focused on statutes designed in their
entirety (OSH Act) or in part (TSCA) with worker safety and health in
mind. However, the recent heightened concern with occupational health
and safety issues has "spilled over" into other areas of the law that initially developed without regard to employee health and safety. Nevertheless, as we show below, these other statutes and common law principles
have proven sufficiently flexible to encompass these issues and, in so doing, have greatly expanded the scope of occupational health and safety
law.
In pursuing the national commitment to equal employment opportunity during the last two decades, Congress has provided extraordinary
legal protection to members of our society on the basis of race, 10 3 religion,1 0 4 sex, 10 5 pregnancy, 10 6 handicap, 0 7 age,' 0 8 veteran status, 0 9
102 Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 51 Fed.
Reg. 35,003 (1986).
103 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982); Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the fair employment practices statutes for the several states. 3
Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
8051-10038 (1986) (State Law Guide) [hereinafter State Fair Employment Laws]; Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 567 (1966).
104 Id.
105 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17; State Fair Employment Laws, supra note 103; Exec. Order No.
11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 320 (1967).
106 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
107 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982); State Fair Employment Laws, supra
note 103.
108 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982); State Fair Employment Laws, supra note 103.
109 Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 (1982);
State Fair Employment Laws, supra note 103.
110 Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), as construed in Guerra v
Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
111 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17; Exec.
Order No. 11,246, 2 C.F.R. § 567 (1966); State Fair Employment Laws, supra note 103.
112 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274B, 100 Stat. 3359,
3374-3380 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
113 State Fair Employment Laws, supra note 103.
114 For example, Illinois prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status and unfavorable
military discharge. Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-101 to 9-102. Florida,
Louisiana and North Carolina prohibit discrimination in employment based on sickle cell trait (FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1001 - :1004 (West 1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-28.1 (1985)).
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alienage," 0 ancestry"' and citizenship." 2 Most states also offer these
protections' 1 3 and some states even offer more expanded coverage.' 14
Throughout the last twenty years, occupational health issues have
repeatedly and increasingly surfaced in the EEO context. While the interface between occupational safety and health and discrimination principles has been most evident with respect to three of the protected
classes-women, handicapped and older workers-one can argue that
the protected status of almost all classes are grounds for the development and growth of equal employment opportunity and occupational
health and safety obligations.
Perhaps the greatest interplay between occupational health and EEO
goals has occurred with respect to female employees. Occupational
health and safety issues surrounding the employment of women workers
basically fall into two categories. First, there are the issues arising from
the differences between the male and female musculo-skeletal systems
and their concomitant differences in strength and agility. Second, there
are the issues relating to the potential dangers to human reproduction
and related protective measures which adversely impact on women. The
latter category has fostered significant legal activity. This activity is directly related to perceived deficiencies in other more traditional health
and safety legislation such as worker's compensation and the OSH
Act.' 15

The last two decades have witnessed a significant increase in concern
within the general public and the legislatures regarding the potential
health risks of certain workplace chemicals. A specific concern involves
the potential effect of occupational exposure to some chemical substances on human reproduction. "Reproductive risk" in the workplace is
not limited to female workers as the DBCP incident has demonstrated.'" 6
With respect to teratogens 1 17 or transplacental carcinogens,"I 8 however,
only exposure to the mother may result in exposure to the fetus. Accordingly, the problems involved with exposure to teratogenic or transplacental carcinogenic substances are sex specific. Because of these sex
specific effects legal questions involving employment discrimination are
raised whenever an employer takes action to protect fetal health. Such
action necessarily impacts exclusively or predominantly on female employees. These employment policies have the concurrent effect of limiting fertile females' access to certain jobs, or of excluding them entirely
115 For a discussion of the interface between occupational health and EEO principles with respect
to the placement of women in physically demandingjobs, see Stillman and Polk, Employment Discrimination, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAW 181-84, supra note 1.
116 DBCP or dibromochloropropane is a liquid pesticide. Occupational ekposure to DBCP is allegedly associated with infertility in exposed male workers. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE PUB. No. OTA-BA-266, REPRODUCTIVE
HEALITH HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 199-200 (1985).

117 A teratogen is a chemical substance or other agent that interferes in the normal development
of the fetus after conception and may result in miscarriage, visible birth defects (such as missing
limbs or cleft palate) or defects not noticeable at birth (such as learning disorders or hormonal
imbalance).
I 18 A carcinogen is any cancer causing substance. A transplacental carcinogen is a cancer causing
substance that crosses the placenta and reaches the fetus.
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from workplaces that the employer believes may be fetotoxic. These policies are called "exclusionary policies."
In the early years following passage of the OSH Act, OSHA shied
away from reproductive hazards issues. Thus, even though evidence regarding alleged transplacental carcinogenic properties of vinyl chloride 9 was adduced at hearings underlying promulgation of OSHA's
vinyl chloride standard, the final standard did not address fetotoxicity.
The Agency did not come to grips with the reproductive risk issue for
several years 120 and, indeed, as of this time OSHA has regulated only
three substances which it considers potentially harmful to human
reproduction.'21
Into this vacuum, many employers began to implement fetus protection policies out of concern for the health of the unborn and/or potential
tort liability resulting from exposure of an employee's offspring to workplace chemicals that might be fetotoxic. 12 2 Employers who were considering implementing exclusionary policies generally opted to implement
them for several reasons, despite potential EEO liability. First, liability
for sex discrimination under Title VII, Executive Order No. 11246 and
virtually all state fair employment practices statutes is limited to equitable relief, which in this context, is limited to lost back pay, benefits and
reinstatement. Moreover, interim earnings are set off against any pecuniary liability and the employee is obligated to mitigate damages by seeking
such employment. By contrast, in a tort case a plaintiff (which in this
situation would be an impaired infant and/or its parent(s)) could recover
compensatory damages, including awards for pain and suffering, as well
119 This evidence included preliminary test results which indicated that some offspring of test
animals exposed to vinyl chloride developed tumors at a rate greater than that of control animals'
offspring. On the basis of this preliminary data NIOSH expressly recommended the following to
OSHA: "In view of the preliminary results of animal toxicology studies, it is recommended that no
woman who is pregnant or who expects to become pregnant should be employed directly in vinyl
chloride monomer operations." NIOSH Recommendations for Medical Surveillance of Workers Exposed to Vinyl Chloride at No. vii. The final OSHA standard is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017
(1986).
120 See, e.g., dialogue between Dr. John Finklea, Director of NIOSH, and Congressman David
Obey (D-Wis.) during Hearingson Dep't of Labor and Dep't Health, Educ. and Welfare Appropriationsfor
1977 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't of Labor - HEW Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 302 (1976):
Mr. Obey. Would existing standards protect the unborn?
Dr. Finklea. Most of the consensus standards were not established with the view of
protecting women of child bearing age in the workplace.
Mr. Obey. You say they were not?
Dr. Finklea. That is correct. With our recommendations that we are making to the
Department of Labor, they do address that issue, but the consensus standards established
in the past do not consider that question. We are trying to relook at all of these ....
Mr. Obey. Most of those chemicals are not regulated at all?
Dr. Finklea. They are regulated but not with this in mind.
In a paper by Dr. Finklea entitled "Women in the Workplace - An Emerging Social Issue" read
before University of Cincinnati Seminar on January 28, 1976, Dr. Finklea observed that federal occupational safety and health standards were, by and large, not established with a view towards ensuring
the protection of workers who may be especially susceptible.
121 ETO, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1047 (1984); lead, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1978); DBCP, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1044 (1978).
122 The possibility for tort actions against employers brought by injured offspring of employees is
a very real concern. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
Although not an employer case, its rationale can be transposed into the employment context.
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as punitive damages which in cases of this kind could possibly result in
multimillion dollar awards. A second factor leading many employers to
address the reproductive risk issue in the EEO forum rather than in tort
litigation is the nature of the trial: sex discrimination cases are bench
trials whereas tort actions are usually tried to ajury. Most employers and
their attorneys would rather avoid the vagaries of jury decision-making
when there is an impaired
baby plaintiff on one side and a large company
123
defendant on the other.
In earlier years the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
("OFCCP"), the federal agencies responsible for enforcing Title VII and
Executive Order No. 11246, respectively, attempted to use traditional
discrimination analysis to deal with sex discrimination issues arising from
exclusionary policies.1 2 4 However, this approach, because of its ad hoc
nature, could not sufficiently incorporate and evaluate the rather unique
legal and medical issues posed by reproductive risks. Indeed, it was not
until the December 1982 decision in Wright v. Olin Corp. 125 that an appellate court finally addressed the employment discrimination implications
under Title VII of fetus protection policies.
In its Wright decision, the Fourth Circuit held that a company fetal
protection policy that has the effect of excluding women from certain
jobs establishes a prima facie violation of Title VII because, while facially
neutral, it clearly has a disparate impact on women. Nevertheless, such a
prima facie showing can be rebutted by the employer establishing a business necessity affirmative defense.' 2 6 Of crucial importance was the
Fourth Circuit's endorsement of the concept that an employer has a legitimate business interest in protecting the health of its employees' unborn children and that that legitimate business interest can rise to a
business necessity affirmative defense. The court set down guidelines for
making this business necessity showing, and held that to establish its
business necessity affirmative defense, an employer must: (a) prove that
there is significant risk of harm to the unborn children of women workers
from workplace exposures; (b) show that the risk is, on the best available
scientific data, substantially confined to the exposure of women workers;
(c) establish by independent, objective evidence the significance of the
risk, the extent of its confinement to the unborn children of women as
opposed to men workers, the consequent necessity of protective measures confined to women workers, and the effectiveness of the actual program for the intended purposes; (d) present opinion evidence by
qualified experts in the relevant scientific fields to support the findings
123 If the parent is the plaintiff, he or she could seek damages for injuries to the child. Direct
injury to the parent/employee falls within the scope of worker's compensation.
124 See, e.g., Forced Resignation of Pregnant X-Ra Technician was Bias, 1986 E.E.O.G. DEC. (CCH)
6442 (1974); Forced Resignation of Pregnant Wlorker, 1986 E.E.O.C. DEc. (CCH) 6443 (1974). See
also EEOC-OFCCP Proposed Interpretative Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards which were published on February 1. 1980 at 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 but withdrawn on
January 16, 1981 at 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 due to criticism by industry, labor and the medical
community.
125 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
126 Id. at 1189-90.
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and conclusions in (c) above; and (e) show that within the qualified scientific community there is a considerable body of opinion that significant
risk exists and that it is substantially confined to women workers, that an
informed employer could not responsibly fail to act on the assumption
that this opinion might be the accurate one. The prima facie business
necessity defense may, however, be rebutted by proof that there are acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose (of protecting the fetus) or accomplish it equally
well with a lesser differential impact between women and men workers.
Whether any alternatives are "acceptable" under Wright, in terms of their
effectiveness and their economic and technological feasibility, is a factual/legal issue to be addressed by the trial court on the basis of the
evidence. 12 7 Despite the burden these guidelines placed on the employer, on remand to the trial court Olin was able to persuade the fact
finder that its policy was justified under the standards articulated by the
128
appellate court.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Wright was subsequently applied by a
state discrimination agency in Steele v. B.F.Goodrich Chemical Co. ,129 a 1983
decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission. In Steele, the state
agency held that the company had satisfied most of the Wright guidelines
but concluded that, in light of Steele's age (48), her professed desire not
to have children and the availability of a birth control pill program, there
was a lesser discriminatory alternative to application of the fetus protection policy to Steele. 130 Thus, the Commission concluded that "in the
case of Mrs. Steele," the company's implementation of its otherwise valid
31
policy was "overkill."' '
In March 1984, the second appellate court case to address reproductive hazards in the EEO context was decided. In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hospital,'32 an x-ray technician was fired when she became pregnant.
The hospital argued that it was unsafe for her to be near radiation while
pregnant and that there were no other positions available to her. In
Hayes, the Eleventh Circuit arrived at a conclusion that was similar to that
expressed in Wright, although Hayes used a somewhat different analysis.
The Hayes court declared that an exclusionary policy could be legal, stating that: "In those instances in which scientific evidence points to a hazard to women, but no scientific evidence exists regarding men, an
employer may be allowed to adopt a suitable policy aimed only at women." 33 The appellate court went on to caution that: "As additional
research on men becomes available, however, the employer must adjust
13 4
its policy or risk running afoul of Title VII.'
The Hayes decision drew a distinction between what it considered
127
REv.
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 1190-92; but see Brodin, Costs, Profits and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
318, 351-53 (1987).
585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 767 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1984).
9 Ill.
HRC Rep. 5 (1983).
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
726 F.2d 1543 (1 ith Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1549.
Id.
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reasonable and unreasonable risks of harm to the fetus, and concluded
that a policy designed to protect the fetus in a radiation environment
below .5 reins was "unreasonable" and, therefore, illegal because the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements has concluded
that a radiation dose below .5 rems is not harmful to the fetus.' 3 5 The
court's rationale may not be widely applicable, however, because
dose/response relationships with regard to potential fetotoxic effects
have not been established for workplace chemicals with the possible exception of lead.
Although neither the Wright nor Hayes decision is totally satisfactory
as a theoretical construct, they have, nonetheless, provided guidelines
for use by other courts, and have focused future litigation on the complex areas of risk assessment and scientific/medical evidence and
opinion.
For the last decade the most conspicuous use of EEO laws to address
a health issue has been in the area of potential risks to human reproduction. It is for that reason that this section has focused on the EEO
law/reproductive risk interface. Trends in the law, however, clearly suggest that there will be continued resort to discrimination statutes in other
occupational health contexts. Such resort is inevitable, for example, in
the developing area of genetic screening. Already some employers are
screening workers to determine whether they possess genetic traits which
may indicate susceptibility to diseases that may be associated with workplace exposures. Since the presence of some of those genetic traits are,
for example, associated with certain racial, religious or ancestral groups,
classic EEO disparate impact and handicap discrimination
arguments will
13 6
arise in the cases challenging such screening practices.
VI.

Federal Labor Law

In 1935, as part of President Roosevelt's New Deal, Congress passed
the Wagner Act and, in so doing, enacted the National Labor Relations
13 7
Act (now known as the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA")),
which established the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") and set
the foundation for this country's regulation of union-management
relations.
At the time of its passage, worker health and safety was not a focus
of the Act; labor organizers had contended, however, that increased
worker safety was part of a union's basic agenda. Thus, in establishing a
framework for the protection and growth of unions, the LMRA at least
tangentially supported a safer occupational environment. However, it is
135 Id. at 1551.
136 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see M. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS
(1984); Professor Rothstein is a contributing author in this symposium, see Rothstein, Refusing to
Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Polio,?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940 (1987).
137 Presently codified, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982). The Act was amended in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act and in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act. The 1947 amendments
changed the statute's name to the Labor-Management Relations Act, which is the current official
statutory designation.
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only recently that organized labor has resorted to the LMRA as a vehicle
for furthering the goal of a safe and healthy workplace.
Use of the LMRA in safety and health matters has largely been in
three areas: First, in the application of the principle of protected concerted activities to union and worker safety and health complaints; second, in the assertion of section 502's protection for safety-related work
stoppages; and, third, in the interpretation of the LMRA's protection of a
union's right to collect health and safety data in order to help ensure a
safe workplace.
Section 7 of the Act protects an employee's right to engage in "concerted activities" for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. Although
not defined by the LMRA, the term "concerted activities" generally includes the actions of employees who have joined together in order to
achieve common goals. A single employee acting alone may also be involved in concerted activity, especially when attempting to induce group
38
activity or acting as a representative of at least one other employee.
The Board has long held that an individual's assertion of a right
grounded in a collective bargaining agreement is deemed concerted activity and therefore protected under section 7 of the LMRA. In its decision in Interboro Contractors, Inc. ,I9 the Board reasoned that asserting a
right contained in a collective bargaining agreement was an extension of
the concerted action that produced the agreement and affected the rights
of all employees that it covered. The Supreme Court accepted the Interboro doctrine as consistent with the LMRA in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,140 noting that it made no sense for a union to negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement where an individual could not unilaterally invoke the rights created against the employer. "A lone employee's
invocation of a right grounded in his collective-bargaining agreement is,
4
therefore, a concerted activity in a very real sense."' '
In City Disposal Systems, a truckdriver refused to drive a truck he believed to be unsafe, invoking a section of the collective bargaining agreement that prohibited the employer from requiring an employee to drive a
reportedly unsafe vehicle. The driver was discharged, and when the
union declined to process his grievance, he filed a charge with the Board,
accusing the employer of violating his rights under section 7 of the
LMRA. The Board found the driver had been engaged in concerted activity and ordered him reinstated with backpay. The Court of Appeals
disagreed, finding that the refusal to drive was not a concerted activity
but an action taken on the employee's own behalf and for his own safety
concerns.14 2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he rationale
of the Interboro doctrine compels the conclusion that an honest and reasonable invocation of a collectively bargained right constitutes concerted
activity, regardless of whether the employee turns out to have been cor138 See, e.g., Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.,
440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971).
139 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
140 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
141 Id. at 832.
142 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
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rect in his belief that his right was violated."'' 43 The Court found that the
driver had reasonably and honestly invoked his right to avoid driving unsafe trucks, thereby engaging in protected concerted activity, and that
the union and the employer had agreed that legitimate safety concerns
were important enough to allow the employees to walk off the job. The
Court accepted the proposition that the LMRA protects an employee
from retaliation when attempting to exercise this right to a safe working
environment.
However, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Burger, Powell and
Rehnquist, stated in dissent that "the fact that the right the employee
asserts ultimately can be grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement is not enough to make the individual's self-interested action concerted."' 4 4 She noted that under the LMRA not every alleged contract
violation, or every safety complaint even if based on a contract provision,
can be the basis for an unfair labor practice complaint. "The statutory
authority to interpret some contract provisions is not authority to resolve
all labor disputes." 1 45 UnderJustice O'Connor's reasoning, the statute
authorizes employees who act together expressing a mutual concern to
vindicate their rights through the Board's administrative processes. An
employee acting alone, however, expressing a personal concern, must
seek vindication through his union or the courts. In City DisposalSystems,
the dissenters found no evidence that the driver had expressed his safety
concerns to any other employees or requested the union's assistance in
protesting to his employer. He merely insisted that the truck was not
safe enough for him to drive. Accordingly, the dissenters did not believe
he had engaged in concerted activity.1 4 6
City Disposal Systems dealt solely with employee safety complaints
rooted in express safety provisions of collective bargaining agreements.
However, the Board has recently indicated in Meyers Industries, Inc. ,147
that safety complaints not expressly covered by collective bargaining
agreements are less likely to be considered concerted activities. This is
contrary to the Board's earlier ruling in Alleluia Cushion Co. ,148 where an
employee in an unorganized plant, acting pursuant to his own concerns
about plant safety and without seeking or obtaining support from other
employees, atempted to enforce state safety regulations by informing the
state's Occupational Safety and Health Administration of potential safety
violations in the plant. The Board found that although the employee
acted alone, safe working conditions are of great concern to all workers,
thereby making this concerted activity. 149 However eleven years elapsed
between Alleluia Cushion Co. and Meyers and a newly constituted Board
saw the issue in a different light.
Meyers also concerned a safety complaint by a truck driver. In Meyers,
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

465 U.S. at 840.
Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 844 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 846.
281 N.L.R.B. 118 (1986).
221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
Id. at 1001.
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Kenneth Prill was discharged for refusing to drive an allegedly unsafe
vehicle and for complaining to the authorities in two states about the
truck. Prill then brought a charge with the Board against his employer,
Meyers Industries, Inc., alleging that his actions constituted protected
concerted activity. The Board found that Prill's safety concerns did not
constitute concerted activity and dismissed the complaint. 150
In reaching this decision, the Board overruled its earlier decision in
Alleluia Cushion Co. 151 The Meyers I Board rejected the Alleluia doctrine
because it effectively allowed the Board, not the employees, to determine
the existence of a safety issue about which the employees ought to have a
group concern. "A Board finding that a particular form of individual activity warrants group support is not a sufficient basis for labeling that
activity 'concerted' within the meaning of Section 7."152 The Board held
that since Prill acted on his own behalf and not on the authority of other
employees, his safety complaint was not concerted activity.
On appeal, the court remanded the case to allow the Board to reconsider the scope of concerted activities under section 7.153 The court felt
that the Board "erred in assuming that the NLRA mandates its present
interpretation of 'concerted activities.' 154 However, the court expressed no view as to whether, under section 7, the Board may adopt the
Meyers test as an exercise of discretion. 15 5 Citing City Disposal for the acceptance of a broad definition of concerted activities which included
safety and health complaints, the court criticized the Board for its belief
that the language and history of section 7 required the term to "be interpreted to protect only the most narrowly defined forms of common action by employees .... ,1156 "[T]he Board failed even to consider
whether the discharge of an employee because of his safety complaints
would discourage other employees from engaging in collective activity to
improve working conditions."'' 57 Despite the dissent's arguments that
the Board's error here was harmless, the court felt it could not sustain
the case under a notion of harmless error "where the agency has failed to
exercise its lawful discretion and has provided no rational basis for its
58
determination."1
On remand, the Board again adopted-this time as an exercise of
discretion-the Meyers I definition of concerted activity. 159 The Board
initially discussed the consistency of the Meyers I standard with City Disposal. Noting that City Disposal included a collective aspect in its definition,
even where only an individual invoked a right to a safe workplace that
had been collectively agreed upon, the Board viewed the Meyers I defini150 Meyers Industries, Inc. and Kenneth Prill, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1984) (hereinafter V.Iyers I).
151 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
152 268 N.L.R.B. at 496.
153 Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub now., Meyers Indus., Inc. v. Prill, 474
U.S. 948 (1985).
154 Id. at 948.
155 Id. at n.46.
156 Id. at 952.
157 Id. at 953.
158 Id. at 957.
159 Meyers Industries, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 118 (1986) (hereinafter V.eve~w II).
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tion as a reasonable balance. "It is not so broad as to create redundancy
in Section 7, but expansive enough to include individual activity which is
connected to collective activity, which lies at the core of Section 7"160
The Board distinguished the collective activity involved when an employee invokes safety rights granted by federal or state legislation as opposed to those rights granted by a collective bargaining agreement. The
invocation of contract rights is "a continuation of the ongoing process of
concerted activity, whereas employee invocation of statutory rights is
not." 1 6 ' While expressing its outrage at the poor safety conditions in
Meyers I, the Board insisted its limited resources were best used enforcing
solely the provisions of the LMRA. The Board concluded that Prill had
not engaged in concerted activities and dismissed his complaint.
Despite the waffling with respect to whether individual safety complaints constitute concerted activities under the LMRA, the Board and
the courts have agreed that, when a group of employees-even those unrepresented by a union or a collective bargaining agreement-protest a
safety
hazard in unison, they are engaged in protected concerted activity.' 6 2 In Tamara Foods, for example, eleven food preparation workers
walked off their jobs together when the plant's ammonia refrigeration
system leaked fumes into their work area. After being discharged for disobeying plant rules, the employees filed an unfair labor practice charge
against their employer. The Board found that section 7 protects the
rights of employees to protest unsafe or unhealthy working conditions,
even without prior notice or following established plant rules. 163 On ap1 64
peal, the court enforced the Board's Decision and Order.
65
Section 502 of the LMRA'
also addresses employee safety and
health complaints. That section provides that "the quitting of labor by
an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or
employees [shall not] be deemed a strike."'' 6 6 The effect of this section is
to create an exception to a no-strike obligation in a collective bargaining
agreement. 167 Section 502 does not modify section 7 and it is applicable
only when the employees are covered by a collective bargaining
68
agreement. 1
Section 502 protects employees from discharge while engaging in a
temporary work stoppage due to clearly evident danger. For example, a
walkout due to the presence of belligerent, intoxicated former employees
at a hazardous job site falls within the protection of the section. 169
However, an employee seeking to justify a work stoppage under sec160 281 N.L.R.B. No. 118.
161 Id.
162 NIRB v. Tamara Foods, Inc., 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
163 Id. at 1176.
164 Id. at 1179.
165 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982).
166 Id.
167 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 385 (1974).
168 The court found § 502 inapplicable in TanaraFoods because there was no collective bargaining agreement in that case. 692 F.2d at 1183.
169 Combustion Engineering, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 542 (1976).
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tion 502 must present " 'ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its
conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists.' "170
In Gateway Coal, the fact that three foremen falsified airflow entries in log
books, potentially jeopardizing mining activities, did not suffice to invoke
the special protection of section 502. The Court reasoned that absent
objective evidence, any employee who believed a fellow worker may at
some future time create a safety hazard should not be permitted to walk
off thejob in the face of a contractual agreement not to do so. The Court
was unwilling to extend section 502 so far without explicit statutory
direction. 17
The labor laws have also recently been used by employees in safety
and health matters as providing a statutory basis for union demands on
employers to share relevant safety and health information. 72 In this regard, it has been argued that the LMRA protects not only an employee's
right to a safe workplace, it also accords a union the right to collect
health and safety data in order to help ensure a safe workplace. To date,
the three Circuit Courts of Appeals that have spoken on this issue have
all upheld a union's right to demand such health and safety data from the
1 73
employer.
A union may only request relevant information; relevance, however,
is not dependent on the existence of a particular controversy but is considered to be any data "reasonably necessary to enable unions effectively
to administer and police collective bargaining agreements or intelligently
to seek their modification."'' 74 In the OCA W decision, where the collective bargaining agreements obligated both mangement and the unions to
take specified actions to safeguard employees' health and safety, the
court ordered the release of the requested data, noting that it would "facilitate the identification of workplace hazards [and] promote meaningful
bargaining calculated to remove or reduce those hazards ....
Under certain circumstances a union may be entitled to access to the
plant in order to collect its own data concerning health and safety. In
Holyoke Water Power Co., the court allowed a nonemployee union representative to measure noise levels in a portion of the plant which was alleged to be particularly noisy. The Board, balancing the union's interest
in obtaining the information against the employer's interest in preventing an invasion of its property, 76 determined that the union's interest
outweighed that of the employer's and ordered access.
Although it granted the Board's petition for enforcement of its order, the First Circuit questioned the balancing test 2kpproach. 17 7 The
170 Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 387.
171 Id. at 386.
172 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Ashford and Ayers, Changes and Opportunities in the
Environntentfor Technology Bagainihg, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 810 (1987).
173 ASARCO, Inc. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Holyoke Water Power Co.,
778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985), fert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3274 (1986); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local
Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
174 711 F.2d at 360.
175 Id. at 361.
176 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
177

Holyoke i'aterPower Co., 778 F.2d at 52.
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court instead found that the information sought was relevant to the
union's statutory duty to bargain about conditions of employment. Unlike OCA W, this health concern was not already part of the collective bargaining agreement, yet the fact that exposure to high levels of noise
could adversely affect employees was enough reason for the Court to require access to the information. In addition, the court found that the
employer had provided inadequate
information and agreed that the
7
union may gather its own data.1 3
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a
union's request to investigate and photograph the site of a mine accident. 79 The court found that the information requested was relevant
and necessary to carry out its duties as bargaining representative. However, the court denied access to an internal self-critical report prepared
by the employer for the purpose of its own accident investigation because the union's interest in the information was outweighed by the chilling effect that disclosure of this document would have. Given that all
relevant information was available to the union, the court found that
"disclosure would seriously thwart the intended primary purpose of the
document to the ultimate detriment of both parties' interest."' 8 0
In conclusion, while not necessarily designed with safety and health
in mind, federal labor laws are sufficiently flexible to encompass these
issues. By resorting to labor laws to protect (a) employees who make
safety and health complaints, (b) employees who refuse to work in "abnormally dangerous conditions" and (c) unions which seek employercontrolled occupational health information, employees and their representatives have discovered a significant vehicle for addressing, from a
preventive standpoint, safety and health issues.
VII.

Tort Law

From the employer's standpoint, a significant and disturbing trend
away from worker's compensation as the exclusive remedy for occupational illness is the resort to tort litigation by employees.'81 Several legal
theories have developed over the last twenty years which seek to circumvent the historical immunity to tort liability accorded by worker's compensation legislation. As we show below, some of these theories have
met with greater success than others. Despite the variable successes of
these different theories, taken together they make significant inroads in
the exclusive remedy doctrine and, in so doing, increase employers' ex82
posure to liability.'
One method by which some employers are drawn into tort litigation
178 Id.
179 4S,4RCO, 805 F.2d 194.
180 Id. at 200.
181 A tort is a wrong or harm for which the common and statutory law permits the injured party
to sue for damages.
182 For example, total liability estimates for the asbestos cases range, incredibly. between $40
billion to $150 billion. A portion of those cases are suits brought by employees who were employed
by asbestos manufacturers. See Comment, ReliefForAsbestos Virtims: .4 legislative.Analris. 20 HARV. J.
ON I. .cIS. 179, 182 (1983).
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for an occupational accident or illness involving its own employees is
through contribution or indemnification actions. If, for example, a boiler
exploded injuring an employee in the course of his normal work activities, the employer would have worker's compensation liability arising
from such an industrial accident. However, if the injured employee
brings an action against the boiler manufacturer, grounded in negligence
or strict liability (for design or manufacturing defects or failure to adequately warn) the manufacturer could file a third-party action against the
employer for contribution, claiming, for example, that it was the employer's negligent operation or maintenance of the equipment which
caused the accident. 183 If the injured employee succeeded in his claim
against the boiler manufacturer, the manufacturer could then seek contribution from the employer. If the manufacturer succeeds in its contribution action, the employer could be obligated to contribute to or
reimburse the manufacturer for the underlying award to the
18 4
employee.
Thus, in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,185 an indemnification action
against an employer by a third-party chemical company was allowed. An
employee died while cleaning the employer's grain storage bin which had
been recently fumigated with a toxic fumigant manufactured by the
chemical company. The employee's estate sued the chemical company in
tort alleging that the product's label failed to adequately warn of its
hazards. The chemical company brought a third-party action against the
employer alleging, inter alia, that the employer was negligent in using
untrained personnel and in taking improper precautions. The employer
argued that because it could not be sued directly by the employee it
should not be allowed to be sued indirectly. The court, nonetheless,
found that the third-party action alleged the employer's breach of an independent duty and therefore allowed the suit.
Another theory that employees use to circumvent the exclusive remedy doctrine is in reality an updated and greatly expanded version of the
intentional tort exception. 18 6 An employer might be held liable for the
intentional act of its employee through application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.' 8 7 Over the years, different courts have applied dif183 See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, cerl.
denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
We are of the opinion that if the manufacturer's third-party complaint alleges that the employer's misuse of the product or assumption of the risk of its use contributed to cause
plaintiff's injuries, the manufacturer has stated a cause of action for contribution. The fact
that the employee's action against the employer is barred by the Workmen's Compensation
Act would not preclude the manufacturer's third-party action against the employer for indemnification and should not serve to bar its action for contribution.
Id. at 15-16, 374 N.E.2d at 443 (citations omitted).
184 However, the employer may be allowed to deduct from such award any worker's compensation award already paid to the employee for the same accident.
185 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
186 The intentional harm exception to many state worker's compensation statutes is expressly
stated in some statutes or has arisen through judicial interpretation of others. See ANNOT., 96 A.L.R.
3d 1064, 1071 (1979) (and cases cited therein).
187 Generally, under this doctrine a corporation can be liable for the wrongful acts or omissions
of its officers, agents or employees acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority or
course of employment. See 18B AM. JUR. 2n Coporations § 2125 (1985).
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ferent standards regarding the type of corporate conduct needed to fall
within the exception. Generally, recklessness or gross negligence by an
employer does not establish the exception.1 8 8 In some states, something
approaching criminal intent is required.' 8 9 These states apply the exception only in cases where the employer knowingly intended to cause harm
to the employee. 190 In still other states, courts require a showing of willfully reckless misconduct which could reasonably and foreseeably lead to
employee injury before they apply the intentional harm exception to the
exclusive remedy doctrine's bar to tort litigation.191
In the asbestos litigation that has developed during the past twenty
years, 19 2 the anomaly arose that employees of asbestos manufacturers
who contracted asbestos related diseases through occupational exposure
were restricted to worker's compensation recovery whereas employees of
an employer who used that same asbestos could sue in tort for the same
types of illnesses. Because tort law permitted claims for pain and suffering and punitive damages and since juries in tort actions were not limited
by a preestablished schedule of benefits, the awards in the tort suits
could far exceed any worker's compensation benefit for what was viewed
by many as virtually identical exposure and illness. Given this perceived
inequity, attempts were made by employees of asbestos manufacturers to
circumvent the exclusive remedy doctrine. To this end, creative plaintiffs' lawyers looked to the intentional harm exception as a doctrinal underpinning for a revolutionary legal theory. Those attorneys argued, in
effect, that the worst case scenario contemplated by the worker's compensation statutes is negligence by the employer, and that when an employer intentionally conspires to withhold from its employees
information regarding health hazards to which the employees are exposed, it has gone so far beyond mere negligence as to have committed
an intentional tort to which the limitations of worker's compensation do
not apply.' 93
188 See, e.g., Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439,417 A:2d 926 (1980); Duk Hwan
Chun v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 556 P.2d 683 (1976).
189 See, e.g., Heikkila v. Ewen Transfer Co., 135 Or. 631, 297 P. 373 (1931); Perry v. Beverage,
121 Wash. 652, 209 P. 1102 (1922).
190 Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 525, 252 A.2d 646 (1969); Castleberry v.
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
191 See, e.g.,Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984); Mandolidis v.
Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
192 The first products liability asbestos suit was filed in 1968. See Comment, supra note 182, at
181-82.
193 See, e.g., McDaniel v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (the failure
of the employer to warn its employees of asbestos hazards amounted to the torts of fraud, misrepresentation and conspiracy to deceive which thereby established the intentional harm exception to the
otherwise applicable worker's compensation statute). See also Martin v. Granite City Steel, 607 F.
Supp. 1430 (S.D. Ill. 1985); Handley v. Unarco Indus., 124 Il1. App. 3d 56, 463 N.E.2d 1011 (1984);
Neal v. Carly Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.
1985). InJohns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d
948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), the California Supreme Court did not allow recovery in tort for
injuries allegedly resulting from an employer's withholding of health hazard information, but did
permit tort recovery for the exacerbation of those initial injuries where the exacerbation was caused
by the concealment of health hazard information, including the concealment of diagnosis of illness
by the company physician.
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This theory, and its various articulations by different courts, has
been used in cases involving chemical substances other than asbestos.
For example, in one case employees were allowed to proceed in tort
against their employer who allegedly concealed information regarding
significant risks from exposure to certain workplace chemical vapors and
failed to take corrective action.1 94 Recently, a senior analytical chemist
sued his former employer as well as two company doctors and fifty firms
that used or supplied chemicals with which he worked for eight hundred
million dollars alleging that the defendants conspired to deceive the
plaintiff about the health risks thereby allowing the plaintiff to suffer immune system damage and possibly cancer. 195
Although numerous courts have refused to adopt this expansion of
the intentional harm exception and have, instead, upheld the application
of more traditional worker's compensation principles, 9 6 it is likely that
employees will continue to argue the intentional harm theory in its various forms thus seeking damages under tort law instead of worker's
compensation.
The intentional harm theory is, however, not the only argument that
employees have used to gain access to remedies in tort. The dual capacity doctrine has also posed a challenge to the exclusive remedy doctine.
As Professor Larson describes dual capacity: Under this doctrine,
[a]n employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an
employee, if-and only if-he possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer that
by established
standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal
97
person. 1
Another commentator has noted:
The dual capacity doctrine is premised on the fact that an employee
retains his right to sue a third-party tortfeasor regardless of the existence of the worker's compensation remedy ....
Thus an employer
who causes injury to an employee through acts taken in a capacity
outside the employment relationship is likened to a third party. The
dual capacity doctrine does not abrogate the exclusivity provision. Instead, the doctrine construes the employer in his second capacity to9 be
"someone other than the employer" for the purposes of the act.1 3
The application of the dual capacity doctrine is perhaps most easily
understood in the following context: An employee of a hospital seeks
treatment as a patient from his employer and such treatment results in a
malpractice claim against the hospital. Several courts have held that,
under these circumstances, the malpractice claim is actionable in tort be194 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
195 McClure v. Zoecon Indus., Inc., No. 86-3338 (C.D. Ill.) reportedin O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), vol. 16,
no. 29 (Dec. 17, 1986), at 799.
196 Copeland v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980); Wright v. FMC
Corp., 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. App. 1978); Kofran v. Amoco Chems. Corp.,
441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982); Hildebrant v. Whirlpool Corp., 364 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1985).
197 2A A. IlARSON, FIE LAW OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 72.81 (1982).
198 Comment, The Dual Capacity Doctrine: Piercingthe Exlunsive Renmedy of ll'orkeKa' Compensation, 43 U.
Pru-r. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (1982).
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cause the alleged harm was caused in the employer's capacity as a health
care provider and not as an employer. 9 9
When an employer is also the manufacturer of a consumer product,
the dual capacity doctrine may apply. For example, an employee of an
auto manufacturer may own, for his personal use, one of his employer's
products. If he is involved in a car accident while not on working time or
working premises, he may bring a products liability action against his employer in his capacity as a consumer. The doctrine has even been applied
successfully in a case against a tire manufacturer which was sued in tort
for injuries suffered by an employee truck driver as a result of an on-thejob blowout.2 0 0 In another case, Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 2 0' employees were permitted to sue in tort for damages they sustained while
working on a scaffold that collapsed. Because the employer also was the
scaffold manufacturer, the California Appellate Court held that the employer possessed two capacities: One as employer and one as manufacturer of the scaffold. In its latter capacity, the employer was subject to
suit in tort even though the injured plaintiffs were employees injured
20 2
during the course of employment.
At this time only a few states have adopted the dual capacity doctrine2 0 3 and even those states have limited this approach. For example,
Illinois permitted use of the doctrine in Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District,2 0 4 when an employee was injured by a purportedly defective truck
leased by his employer. However, since Smith, Illinois has repeatedly rejected application of the doctrine. Thus, for example, in Sharp v. Gallagher2 0 5 the Illinois Supreme Court held that an employer who also
owns the land on which an employee is injured is one legal entity, even
though it may have separate names and federal tax identification numbers, and as such the dual capacity doctrine did not apply. In McCormick
v. CaterpillarTractor Co. ,206 an employee's tort action against the company
physician for alleged malpractice received in the course of treatment for
an on-the-job injury was denied. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the treatment at issue was provided in the context of the state worker's
199 See, e.g., Duprey v. Shane, 241 P.2d 78 (Cal. App. 1951), af'd., 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8
(1952); Panagos v. North Detroit Gen. Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971). In Tatrai
v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reached the same result although, instead of using a dual capacity rationale, held that the illness did
not arise within the course of employment thereby negating coverage under Pennsylvania's worker's
compensation statute.
200 Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
201 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
202 "The decisive dual-capacity test is not concerned with how separate or different the second
function of the employer is from the first, but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first, that of employer." Id. at 109, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 800
(quoting A. LARSON, supra note 197, at § 72.80).
203 These states are California, Illinois, Michigan, Montana and Ohio. A. LARSON, supra note 197,
at § 72.81. In Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), the Supreme Court, while not expressly
referring to the dual capacity doctrine, seemed to endorse its application as an exception to the
exclusive remedy clause found in the Longshoreman's Act which provides a recovery scheme comparable to worker's compensation. See Comment, supra note 198, at 1019-28.
204 77 I11.2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
205 95 I11.
2d 322, 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983).
206 85 IlI. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
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compensation statute's mandate that employers make provision for medical care for occupational injury and was, therefore, covered by the act's
exclusive remedy clause. In another Illinois case, Olds v. Egnatz andJohnson &Johnson Products, Inc. ,207 a medical malpractice action was brought
against a pharmaceutical company and its medical director under a dual
capacity theory. Olds differed from McCormick in that the underlying injury that sent the employee to the plant clinic did not arise out of work
but had occurred at home. The plaintiff presented evidence that about
half of all cases treated in the clinic were nonoccupational, and that employee visit records had an "occupational" as well as a "nonoccupational" box to check. The employee was treated for her swollen ankle,
but the treatment resulted in second degree bums. She argued that she
was not limited to worker's compensation because, by treating nonoccupational injuries the medical director and the company which owned the
clinic were functioning as health care providers and were, thereby, liable
for malpractice as any other health care provider.
Among the defenses propounded in a motion for summary judgment, the company and its doctor argued that the crucial fact was not
where the plaintiff's initial injury, i.e., the swollen ankle, arose, but rather
that the injury for which she was seeking recovery (the bum) was received while on working time, on her employer's premises and as a result
of action by a fellow employee. It was further argued that the medical
services that the employer provided to the plaintiff were offered only to
employees, were not available to the general public and were received by
the plaintiff only as a consequence of her employment and her status of
employee. Finally, the defendants argued that since the employee had
already recovered for the same alleged injuries under worker's compensation, the Industrial Commission's holding underlying the benefits
award that the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment was
res judicata. The Illinois Circuit Court ultimately granted the defendants' motion in an unpublished decision, 20 8 and, in so doing, significantly
minimized the risk of malpractice suits for employers who provide health
care services to their employees, at least in Illinois.
Cases such as McCormick and Olds suggest that the more employers
provide health care services to their employees beyond immediate aid for
on-the-job injuries, the greater the risk that employees will attempt to
equate them with health care providers including the attendant potential
for malpractice claims. This increased risk could also apply to an employer who elects to provide health care to nonemployee visitors or, possibly, to off duty employees and their families.
The foregoing has been only a brief overview of some of the legal
theories that have been utilized by employees attempting to bring actions
in tort for occupational illness and injury. While some of these theories
have proved more successful than others or have had wider application,
and while some courts demonstrate greater receptiveness to these argu1
207 No. 82 L 19739 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Sept. 12, 1983).
208 Olds v. Egnatz and Johnson &Johnson Prods., Inc., No. 82 L 19739 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Sept.
12, 1983).
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ments than others, it is nevertheless clear that as long as juries continue
to award toxic tort third-party plaintiffs multimillion dollar awards, employees claiming occupational illnesses will continue to seek ways to
break out from what they perceive as the comparative confines of the
worker's compensation recovery system.
VIII. Conclusion
Occupational safety and health law today is a constellation of interrelating and, at times, conflicting laws, regulations and legal theories.
The significant expansion of occupational safety and health law over the
last two decades is, of course, attributable to a number of factors, not the
least of which are: The heightened awareness and understanding of certain occupational diseases; the health risks presented by some environmental chemicals; the perceived inadequacies of worker's compensation
as a means of addressing or redressing occupational illness and injury;
the difficulty in constructing legal doctrines where state-of-the-art health
information does not provide definitive answers with respect to causation
and exacerbation of illness; and the lack of a coherent unified national
policy to respond to these issues. Given our society's litigious nature;
our increasing awareness of health risks; and federal, state and local law
makers' response to these social concerns, it was inevitable that occupational safety and health law would expand far beyond worker's
compensation.
The statutes, regulations, legal theories and judicial decisions discussed in this Article have developed to address most of today's occupational safety and health issues and concerns. The OSH Act and TSCA
are prevention oriented, while the worker's compensation and tort law
systems become operative once illness or injury has occurred. Labor
laws have been employed to further employees' interests in their safety
and health, frequently elevating workplace safety to prominence in labor/management discussions and negotiations. However, because various laws and legal doctrines have developed to serve different goals, we
have a quiltwork of processes to further the goal of safe and healthy
workplaces, rather than a comprehensive and consistent approach.
Thus, there is often duplicative, unnecessary and inconsistent regulation
and litigation, which does not serve to further the interests of either employers or employees.

